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EVIDENTIARY INEQUALITY
SANDRA F. SPERINO*

ABSTRACT

Federal employment discrimination law is rife with evidentiary inequality.
Courts allow employers to draw from a broad palette of evidence to defend
against discrimination claims, while highly restricting the facts from which
plaintiffs can prove their claims.

This Article draws from hundreds of cases to show how judges favor the
employer's evidence and disfavor the plaintiff's evidence across multiple
dimensions, such as time, witnesses, documents, relevance, and reliability.
Judges have created a host of named doctrines that severely restrict the
evidence plaintiffs are allowed to use to prove their discriminationclaims. At
the same time, a host of unnamed, and thus invisible, doctrines and preferences
further bias the evidentiary record in favor of the employer. The cumulative
weight of the named and invisible doctrines make it difficult for plaintiffs to
prove discrimination.
This evidentiary inequality is court created and is not required by or
contained within the federal discriminationstatutes. This Article argues that
judges must create clear rules that guard againstthis evidentiary inequality.

* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I
would like to thank Jessica Clarke, William Corbett, Doron Dorfman, Katie Eyer, D. Wendy
Greene, Stacy Hawkins, Robert Mantell, Janet Moore, Charles Sullivan, Cathy Ventrell-

Monsees, and Deborah Widiss for their important insights on early drafts of this Article. This
work also benefited from helpful comments from participants in the AALS Section on
Employment Discrimination Incubator Workshop, including Minna Kotkin, Michael Selmi,
Emily Waldman, Richard Carlson, and David Simson, and questions during the 2020
Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law and the University of Cincinnati

College of Law Summer Workshop. Research assistants Blythe McGregor and Janelle
Thompson provided invaluable help poring over discrimination cases.
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INTRODUCTION

Federal employment discrimination law is rife with evidentiary inequality.
Federal courts often apply radically different standards in evaluating evidence
and the inferences that may be drawn from the evidence depending on which
party is relying on it. Courts exclude evidence that workers offer and downplay
the significance of even admissible evidence, while allowing employers great
latitude in what evidence to admit and great deference as to what that evidence
establishes.
Consider a case in which an employee has evidence that her supervisor used
racial epithets to describe her. A year later, the supervisor fired her. Many courts
will invoke the stray remarks doctrine and refuse to allow the plaintiff to use
evidence of the racial epithets to support a race discrimination claim.1 Through
the stray remarks doctrine, judges can refuse to consider evidence of
discriminatory comments or actions in the workplace if the court deems the
comments are too remote in time from the contested decision, not made in the
context of the decision, or too ambiguous to show discriminatory bias. 2
However, courts will regularly allow defendants to use evidence that is remote
in time and context from the contested employment decision. Employers
regularly defend discrimination cases by trying to show that the employee
engaged in misconduct or otherwise was a bad employee. 3 Courts will regularly
allow a defendant to rely on evidence that is years old to establish the narrative
that the employee was a bad apple. 4 Courts rely on this evidence even when the
employer continued to employ the individual and often took no or minimal
action in response to the alleged misconduct. 5 The employer can pull together
evidence across a wide swath of time, while the courts limit the plaintiff's
evidence to a narrow time frame. This is just one of the many ways that courts

favor the defendant and disfavor the plaintiff.
This

Article

dimensions:

examines

evidentiary

time, witnesses,

inequality across

documents, relevance,

several different

and reliability.

It

' Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. REv. 149, 149 (2012) (noting that doctrine
devalues or partially devalues probative evidence); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75
Mo. L. REv. 313,347 (2010) ("Notwithstanding the often inflammatory nature of the remarks,
their force tends to fall on the deaf ears of the courts.").
2 E.g., Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00554, 2013 WL
696424, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013) (describing stray remarks inquiry); Mosberger v. CPG
Nutrients, No. 2:01-cv-01100, 2002 WL 31477292, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2002) (same).

3 See infra Sections II.A, III.A.
4 See infra Section II.A.

5 See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00531, 2019 WL
2122989, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2019) (describing employer's submission of thirteen years

of complaints made and disciplinary action taken against plaintiff); Basil v. CC Servs., Inc.,
116 F. Supp. 3d 880, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (noting plaintiff's deficient performance ratings
over six years).
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demonstrates that across each dimension, courts often treat employer evidence
differently than they do similar evidence offered by plaintiffs. 6
The final result of this evidentiary inequality is that courts allow employers
to draw from a broad palette of facts to defend against discrimination cases,
while highly restricting the facts from which plaintiffs can prove their claims.
When employers try to prove they did not discriminate, courts allow them to use
evidence that draws from numerous people across wide swaths of time. Courts
often allow employers to rely on evidence that is vague or appears to rely on

hearsay. Additionally, courts do not require employers to tie the evidence
together and prove how it relates to the contested decision.
On the other hand, courts often exclude or diminish evidence from workers,
requiring them to prove their cases through a narrow band of witnesses and
within a constricted time span. Courts require workers to prove how their
evidence relates to the contested decision and often heavily restrict what
evidence counts. Courts often require the plaintiffs' evidence to be more specific
than the defendants' evidence, and judges often reject evidence under the
hearsay doctrine.
Evidentiary inequality manifests itself through the cumulative weight of
court-created, named doctrines and through a series of unnamed, and somewhat
invisible, doctrines and preferences.
This evidentiary inequality is predicted by a wide range of social science and
legal scholarship. 7 This is the first article to show how the tendency to favor one
6

1 am not arguing

that evidentiary inequality exists in all cases. Counterexamples abound.
The prevalence of these evidentiary rulings that disfavor plaintiffs occurs frequently enough
to be problematic, especially given that courts often disfavor a plaintiff's evidence when
ruling on a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
? See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Discounting Credibility: Doubting the Stories of Women
Survivors of Sexual Harassment, 51 SETON HALL L. REv. 289, 293 (2020) (discussing
credibility discounting); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the
CredibilityDiscount, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2017) (noting that women accusers of sexual
assault usually do not "fare well in these contests"); Anita Kim & Natasha Tidwell, Examining
the Impact of Sexism on Evaluations of Social Scientific Evidence in Discrimination
Litigation, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 520, 521 (2014) (discussing how perceptions of protected

classes affect admissibility of expert evidence); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske,
Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate

Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 997, 1061-62 (2006) ("But well-established insights from
psychological science, accumulated over fifty years of peer-reviewed, replicated research, has

called [suppositions about how bias operates] into serious doubt, if not discredited them
entirely."); Rebecca B. Zietlow, Beyond the Pronoun: Toward an Anti-SubordinatingMethod
ofProcess, 10 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2000) ("To make the system more responsive to the

needs of those outsiders, the insights and methods of those outsiders should be incorporated
into the present procedural framework."); see also Jerry Kang, Judge Mark Bennett, Devon

Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G.
Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA

L. REv. 1124, 1154 (2012) (addressing possibility of implicit bias in employment
discrimination cases but explicitly declining to consider how this might impact evidence
admitted).
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party pervades federal discrimination law. While a rich literature exists
critiquing individual discrimination doctrines, this Article demonstrates that the
tendency to buoy the defendant's evidence and undermine the plaintiff's
evidence is not confined to these doctrines. It occurs through a number of diffuse
mechanisms.
This evidentiary inequality is especially problematic because it often occurs
when judges are deciding an employer's motion for summary judgment. At the

summary judgment stage, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct judges
to make all reasonable inferences from a given fact in favor of the nonmoving
party. 8 Notwithstanding that directive, judges routinely make inferences against

the plaintiff at the summary judgment stage when the employer moves for
summary judgment in its favor. Not only are judges routinely making inferences
against the worker (the nonmoving party) at summary judgment, they are also
failing to apply the same inferences to the employer's evidence that they apply

to the worker's evidence.
Courts must recognize this evidentiary inequality and then dismantle it.
Courts should abolish most, if not all, of the named inferences. They should
follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
when adjudicating summary judgment and other similar motions. However, if
judges are not willing to abolish the inferences, they should at least apply the

same inferences to the defendant's evidence as they do the plaintiff's evidence.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should use its supervisory
authority to create explicit rules that would govern federal district court judges
when ruling on employers' motions for summary judgment and appellate courts

considering appeals related to summary judgment. These rules would emphasize
a judge's appropriate role at summary judgment, caution judges against making

inferences in favor of the moving party, and require judges to fully explain all
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Short of this, the Supreme Court
should reiterate that it has repeatedly rejected the evidentiary inequality imposed
by the lower courts.
Part I provides an overview of federal discrimination law and a preview of
the mechanisms courts use to restrict evidence. Part II explores how courts view
time differently when considering evidence submitted by the plaintiff as
compared to similar evidence submitted by the employer. Part III explores how
courts allow employers to draw evidence from a wide variety of witnesses and

documents, while limiting the witnesses and documents that support the
plaintiff's case. Part IV examines how courts require plaintiffs to provide more

8 FED.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). The critiques in this Article are not limited to the summary

judgment stage; however, this Article focuses on summary judgment because it is the
procedural step that affects the most cases in a dispositive manner. See, e.g., Kevin M.
Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 131 (2009) (discussing how appellate
court reversals favor employers).

?
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precise evidence than they require from defendants. Part V proposes a path
forward.
I.

AN OVERVIEW

OF EVIDENTIARY INEQUALITY

Evidentiary inequality occurs in three primary ways. First, judges have

infused discrimination jurisprudence with doctrines and concepts that favor
employers and disfavor workers, contrary to the text and purposes of federal
discrimination law. While the individual doctrines are problematic, this Article
focuses on the cumulative weight of the doctrines and on doctrines that have not
received sufficient attention.
The second issue is the most difficult to see because of the absence of
doctrine. Courts will regularly apply an inference that favors the employer
without applying a similar inference that would favor the worker. The fact that
the plaintiff is not getting the benefit of similar inferences is not mentioned in
the written opinions. The absence of the inference is only visible after reading
the facts of cases and how courts resolve those cases.
Finally, evidentiary inequality also occurs in the way judges choose to
describe evidence. Judges often fail to fully describe the plaintiff's evidence and
sometimes encapsulate it in a single word or phrase (for example, "conclusory"),

while describing and relying on evidence from the defendant that is contested or
irrelevant. Judges often characterize the plaintiff's evidence as unreliable, even
while allowing defendants to rely on similar evidence.
The totality of the evidentiary inequality is relatively well hidden for several
reasons. It is spread across many cases. In any particular case, both the plaintiff
and the defendant may not submit evidence that relies on similar inferences.
Thus, in a particular case, a judge may not realize the logical inconsistency that
underlies the evidentiary inequality. Even in cases where judges are confronted
with evidence relying on similar inferences, they often do not recognize the
inferential similarity and the way they treat similar evidence differently
depending on the party submitting the evidence.

Only some of the evidentiary doctrines that create the inequality have names.
It is easy to identify and understand when courts use the named doctrines
because they use the name of the doctrine and explain how it works before
applying it. Scholars have extensively discussed and critiqued some, but not all,
of these named doctrines. 9 The named doctrines only describe a portion of the
evidentiary inequality.

9 See, e.g., Katie Eyer, The Return of the Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm, 94

WASH. L. REv. 967, 982-83 (2019) (critiquing circuit court interpretations of McDonnell
Douglas that are hypertechnical and contradict Supreme Court precedent); Victor D.
Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral
Credentialingand the Psychologicaland Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 6-7

(2016) (discussing same-actor inference and stating that it "continues to deprive claimants of
access to justice"); Stone, supra note 1, at 180 (explaining that judges often sidestep "proper
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The rest of the inequality occurs through other mechanisms. To get the entire
picture, one also must identify unnamed inferences the courts apply. It is only
by reading hundreds of cases that the evidentiary inequality emerges. This
Article is the first to provide a picture of how the combined use of the named
and unnamed doctrines creates evidentiary inequality.
A.

FederalDiscriminationLaw Generally
Federal employment discrimination law is primarily grounded in four

statutes: Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 10 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section
1981"). Title VII is the cornerstone federal employment discrimination statute.
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a worker because of
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion." t

Title VII's main operative provision consists of two subparts. Under the first
subpart, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to take certain
employment actions or "otherwise to discriminate" against a person with respect

to compensation or in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 2 Under Title VII's
second subpart, it is unlawful for an employer to "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee" because of a protected trait.13 These

two subparts form the foundation of Title VII's text. 14
The ADEA contains similar language,15 and the ADA contains similar
concepts, although not always stated in the same language. 16 Section 1981 does

not use similar language; however, the courts have often used the same
summary judgment standard[s]" and "substitute their personal judgments for those of
reasonable factfinders"); Nancy Gertner, Losers' Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 118
(2012) (explaining that stray remarks doctrine "discounts explicitly discriminatory
statements"); Martin, supra note 1, at 347 (describing courts' treatment of "expressions of
bias" as "unfavorable"); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate

Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2001) (arguing that frameworks allow courts to
ignore collective weight of evidence).
" The primary operative provisions of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA are,
respectively, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); and 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
2 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
13 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
" Congress amended Title VII in 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). However, this
does not change the fact that the foundational text of Title VII is contained in 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a).
11 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (prohibiting employers from refusing to hire or discharging; limiting,
segregating, or classifying; or reducing the wages of employees because of age).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)-(b) (prohibiting employers from discriminating based on
disability).
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frameworks to analyze disparate treatment claims under Section 1981 and Title
18
VII. 17 Each of these statutes also prohibits retaliation. Under each of these
statutory regimes, a plaintiff has the right to a jury trial under certain
circumstances.

19

On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has reiterated that federal
discrimination statutes are designed to "strike at the entire spectrum" of
discriminatory conduct. 20 The Court has repeatedly stated that "Title VII
21
tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle or otherwise."
Named Doctrines

B.

Despite the broad statutory language of the discrimination statutes and their
purposes of stopping discrimination in the workplace, courts have seeded the
discrimination jurisprudence with a number of doctrines that favor the employer
and disfavor the worker. This Section will focus on certain perversions of the
22
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the honest

17 See, e.g., Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1056 (8th Cir. 1997) ("The analysis
applicable to Title VII disparate treatment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims in employment cases

is the familiar three-part framework initially set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green .... "). But see Comcast v. Nat'l Ass'n of Aft. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009,
1013 (2020) (holding plaintiff is required to establish "but for" cause in Section 1981 cases).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a), 12203(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). While 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the
ADEA as applied to federal employees have no expressed non-retaliation provisions, both
statutes implicitly prohibit retaliation using standards similar to the expressed statutory
protection. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (holding that Section
1981 prohibits "retaliation against a person who has complained about a violation of another

person's contract-related 'right"'); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2008) (holding
that ADEA federal sector provision authorizes claim from "victim of retaliation due to the
filing of a complaint of age discrimination").
19 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c). Plaintiffs are not entitled to a jury trial in all
instances. For example, a jury trial is not available for disparate impact claims under Title

VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (c). The ADEA's federal sector provision does not provide a jury
trial. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 168 (1981) (finding that Congress could have
provided for jury trials if it had desired to do so).
20 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("The phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." (quoting City of L.A.,

Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))).
21 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)); see also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977) ("[A] prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies
or practices that are neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in

effect against a particular group."); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
280 & n.8 (1976) (finding that Title VII protected "white men and white women and all

Americans" (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 2578 (1964) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler)));
McDonnellDouglas, 411 U.S. at 801 ("Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise.").
22

411 U.S. at 802-03.
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belief doctrine, and the stray remarks doctrine. Importantly, none of the
following concepts are contained within the text of the federal discrimination
statutes.

Courts often use court-created frameworks to analyze discrimination cases. A
court first places a set of facts within a category and then applies the appropriate
framework to those facts. 23 In an individual disparate treatment case, the plaintiff
or a small group of plaintiffs argues that the employer discriminated against
them because of a protected trait. 24
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided McDonnell Douglas, announcing the
three-part burden-shifting framework that is now called the McDonnell Douglas
test. 25 Courts regularly use McDonnell Douglas to evaluate discrimination and
retaliation claims under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and Section 1981.26
McDonnell Douglas is one way to establish discrimination. 27 To use the
framework, the plaintiff first establishes a prima facie case, after which a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises. 28 In McDonnell Douglas, the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by
showing,

(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
23 See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking DiscriminationLaw,

110 MICH. L. REv. 69

(2011) (providing an overview and critique of frameworks).
24 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-PartyHarassers,Accommodation, and
the Disaggregationof DiscriminatoryIntent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368-69 (2009)

(discussing disparate treatment and disparate impact).
" McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court has stated that McDonnell Douglas
does not represent the elements of a claim under Title VII but rather is an evidentiary standard
that can be used to evaluate employment discrimination cases. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (holding that employment discrimination complaint "must contain
only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"
(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))).
26 See, e.g., Steele v. Pelmor Lab'ys, Inc., 725 F. App'x 176, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018); TriCities Holdings LLC v. Tenn. Admin. Procs. Div., 726 F. App'x 298, 308 (6th Cir. 2018);
Robinson v. Jackson State Univ., 714 F. App'x 354, 359 (5th Cir. 2017); Gavurnik v. Home
Props., L.P., 712 F. App'x 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2017); Lawson v. Homenuk, 710 F. App'x 460,
462 (2d Cir. 2017); Melendez v. Bd. of Educ., 711 F. App'x 685, 688 (4th Cir. 2017);
Dagnesses v. Target Media Partners, 711 F. App'x 927, 933 (11th Cir. 2017); Malcolm v.
Vicksburg Warren Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 709 F. App'x 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2017); Harrell v.
Robinson, 703 F. App'x 440, 443-44 (8th Cir. 2017); Parker Excavating, Inc. v. Lafarge W.,
Inc., 863 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2017).
27 Although many plaintiffs frame their case through McDonnell Douglas, they are not
required to use the McDonnell Douglas test to prove discrimination. Instead, a court can

consider whether the evidence, taken together in its entirety, "would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiffs race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed
factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action." Ortiz v. Werner Enters.,

Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016).
2 O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996).
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position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
29
other persons possessing complainant's qualifications.
The Supreme Court cautioned, however, that the factors required to establish a
prima facie case will necessarily vary depending on the factual scenario of the
underlying case. 30 The Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that the
31
prima facie case is not supposed to be onerous.

Subsequent cases have rearticulated the prima facie case so that it can be
applied to a broader set of factual circumstances. For example, some courts
articulate the second prong of the test as requiring that "the plaintiff [show she]
was qualified for the position in question." 32 The plaintiff can satisfy the second
factor "by showing that she performed at a level that generally met her
33
employer's objective minimum qualifications."
However, many courts have perverted this second prong and unnecessarily

focus the evidence on the beliefs of the decisionmaker at the time of the
contested action. 34 The court then limits the plaintiff's ability to present evidence
of the plaintiff's good performance over time or from people the court does not
5
deem to be decisionmakers. 3
If a plaintiff successfully establishes the prima facie case, a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination arises. 36 The burden of production then shifts to
the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
30 Id. at 802 n.13.
31 See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The burden
29

of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."); Young v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015) (stating same).
32 Bulifant v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 698 F. App'x 660, 663 (3d Cir. 2017).
33 Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014).
3 Berini v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
("[T]he plaintiff's managers felt that she was making an unacceptable number of errors, that
she had not managed to learn the skills required by the new accounting methodologies, and
that she was made aware of these shortcomings."). But see Angelone v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP,

No. 2:05-cv-02106, 2007 WL 1033458, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007) (indicating that because
some people for whom plaintiff worked thought her work was satisfactory, she could meet
second prong).
35

McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.

Dec. 15, 2011) ("However, it is well settled that in determining satisfactory job performance,
it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant."), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2012 WL 714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), affd, 475 F. App'x
462 (4th Cir. 2012); Berini, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. The courts are inconsistent on this prong
of McDonnellDouglas. See, e.g., Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 352 n.21 (5th
Cir. 2005) (allowing plaintiff to rely on evidence of past performance reviews to establish this
prong).
36 See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1996) (discussing
the logical connection between the elements of a prima facie employment discrimination case
and the resulting rebuttable presumption of illegal discrimination).
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allegedly discriminatory decision or action, thereby rebutting the presumption. 37

At this stage, the employer often presents evidence that the plaintiff engaged in
misconduct or that the plaintiff lacked the required skills or qualifications for a
particular job. 38 If the employer meets its relatively light burden, the inquiry
proceeds to the third stage.
In the third stage, the plaintiff may show that the employer's stated reason is
pretext.39 From this showing, a factfmder may infer that the employer
discriminated because of a protected trait.4 0 The plaintiff may also rely on any
other evidence that helps establish that the employee's protected trait caused the
outcome. 4 1
As shown throughout this Article, courts often limit what evidence counts as
pretext.4 2 They also use the "honest belief' doctrine to exclude or diminish
plaintiffs' evidence by declaring that such evidence contesting the employer's
decision is not relevant because only the decisionmaker's belief at the time of
the contested action is relevant.43
Courts also use another doctrine, the "stray remarks" doctrine, to decline to
consider plaintiffs' evidence. Through this doctrine, judges can refuse to
consider evidence of discriminatory comments or actions in the workplace if the
court deems the comments too remote in time from the contested decision, not
made in the context of the decision, or too ambiguous to show discriminatory
bias. 44 For example, in an age discrimination case, if a plaintiff tried to admit

37 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

38 Id at 803 (finding employer "assigned respondent's participation in unlawful conduct
against it as the cause for his rejection").
39 Id. at 804 (instructing lower court on remand to allow respondent the opportunity to

show employer's reason for respondent's rejection was pretextual).
40 See id at 807.
41 See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981) (suggesting plaintiff
may succeed with her ultimate burden of persuasion with either direct evidence of

discrimination or indirect evidence of discrimination by showing the employer's proffered
reason was pretext).
42 See generally D. Wendy Greene, Pretext Without Context, 75 Mo. L. REv. 403 (2010)
(criticizing how courts approach pretext).
43 See Gertner, supranote 9, at 121-22 (explaining how the "honest belief' doctrine makes

it more difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate pretext by granting employers leeway with their
proffered reason for the adverse employment action).
44 See Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00554, 2013 WL

696424, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013) (noting the following issues are relevant to the stray
remarks inquiry: "(1) who made the remark, i.e., a decisionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level
coworker; (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue;
(3) the content of the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as
discriminatory; and (4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related

to the decision making process" (quoting Silver v. N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 2d
354, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2007))); Mosberger v. CPG Nutrients, No. 2:01-cv-01100, 2002 WL
31477292, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2002) (same); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 180
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evidence that ten years ago a coworker made a racist statement, the evidence
would be excluded because it is not relevant to the underlying claim. While the
stray remarks doctrine has some legitimate uses, many judges use it expansively
to exclude otherwise relevant evidence supporting plaintiffs' claims.
The stray remarks doctrine is not contained within the text of any of the main
federal discrimination statutes. 45 Instead, the doctrine is a special evidentiary
46
rule that courts created and apply in discrimination cases. The stray remarks
doctrine first appeared in a concurring opinion by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
47
in the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Professor Kerri Lynn Stone
has noted that the doctrine "had a groundswell of usage, building in popularity
year after year." 48 Professor Jessica Clarke has observed that the doctrine has
"spread like a cancer through lower court opinions in a number of procedural
contexts." 49 Former federal judge Nancy Gertner referred to the doctrine as
"[h]igh on the list of heuristics that fundamentally distort the outcome of
discrimination cases." 5 0
(explaining effect of courts failing to treat stray remarks as direct evidence of discrimination

and also declaring piece of evidence to be worthless or effectively worthless); Martin, supra
note 1, at 347-51 (explaining why courts do not treat stray remarks as evidence of pretext).
45 Cf Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why "Motivating Factor"

Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARiz. L. REv. 357, 389-92 (2020) (discussing
how courts expanded stray remarks doctrine). See generally Stone, supra note 1 (discussing
the proliferation of stray comment jurisprudence). Courts do not uniformly apply the stray

remarks doctrine and some judges have criticized it. See, e.g., Holmes v. Marriott Corp., 831
F. Supp. 691, 704-06 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (reviewing different jurisdictions' legal standards for
stray remark evidence).
46 See Stone, supranote 1, at 159 ("The 'stray remarks' [doctrine] ... is a series of looselybound doctrines and casual labels that different courts assign to proffered evidence of
discrimination that they plan to discount or ignore.").
47 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Rather than claiming that stray
remarks were not relevant in intentional discrimination cases, Justice O'Connor was making
a narrow claim related to the specific issue of whether a plaintiff could proceed under a mixed-

motive framework without what she called "direct evidence" of discrimination. Id. at 276-77.
48 Stone, supra note 1, at 170.
49 Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 Nw. U. L. REv. 505, 542 (2018).

50 Gertner, supra note 9, at 118. Courts have even created two additional special inferences
that favor the employer. The "same protected class" inference presumes that a decisionmaker
who is in the same protected class as the employee would not discriminate against the
employee based on the protected trait they share. See, e.g., Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting the "primary players" behind plaintiffs
discharge were also in the class protected by the ADEA); Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs.,
Inc., No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059643, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2010) ("[T]he fact that the
ultimate decision makers in this case were older than Cartee mitigates any inference of age
discrimination."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL

5059639 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2010). But see Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361
(7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting inference). Similarly, the "same actor" inference allows a court to
assume that if the same person who hires or promotes an employee also fires or demotes the
employee, the action taken against the employee cannot be discriminatory. Brown v. CSC
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These doctrines favor the employer and disfavor the worker. The cumulative
weight of these doctrines makes it extraordinarily difficult for plaintiffs to get
judges to consider the entire evidentiary record in their cases. While these
doctrines are applied in thousands of cases, it is worth noting that none of them
are included in or required by the text of the employment discrimination
statutes. 51 And, many of them are actually contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.52
C.

Invisible Ideas: The Rest of the Picture

The cumulative weight of the named doctrines makes it difficult for plaintiffs
to get their evidence admitted, considered, and given full weight by courts.
However, these named doctrines are not the only causes of evidentiary
inequality. There are also several unnamed ways that inequality manifests.
Because the preferences are not named, the role they play is largely invisible.
Here is one of the less visible ways inequality occurs: Courts do not apply the

named doctrines in the same way to the plaintiff's and the defendant's evidence.
Courts treat very similar evidence differently depending on the party presenting
it. As discussed in the prior subsection, there are several named doctrines that
prioritize evidence by the decisionmaker at the time of the contested action.
Courts regularly use these named doctrines to exclude or diminish the plaintiff's
evidence. For example, a court might exclude evidence about the plaintiff's good
performance simply because it is from a coworker or because it reflects the
plaintiff's performance at a time earlier than the contested decision.53
However, courts allow defendants to present evidence to support their actions

by people who were not decisionmakers at the time of the contested action. 54
This same kind of evidence is rejected when offered by plaintiffs. 5

Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (inferring age discrimination was not the motive
behind plaintiff's discharge since plaintiff was hired and fired by the same decisionmaker);
see Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 796-97 (4th Cir. 1991) ("In assessing whether Proud
established that age was a motivating factor for his discharge, we focus on the undisputed fact
that the individual who fired Proud is the same individual who hired him less than six months
earlier with full knowledge of his age."). But see Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d

129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (criticizing use of the doctrine when there is a long intervening period
between the positive decision and the negative one); Natasha T. Martin, Immunityfor Hire:
How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40

CONN. L. REv. 1117, 1135 (2008) (suggesting same).
51 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
52 See Eyer, supra note 9, at 967.

" See, e.g., Diamond v. Bea Maurer, Inc., 128 F. App'x 968,973 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
evidence of plaintiffs good performance because it was months before termination); see also
cases discussed in Section II.B.
s4 See generally cases discussed in Section II.A.

" Cf Kang et al., supra note 7, at 1156 (discussing how motivated reasoning can cause
decisionmakers to change the criteria for making a decision based on the person they want to
favor).
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Evidentiary inequality occurs in another unnamed way: Courts often refuse to

apply the same inferences to different kinds of evidence. As discussed earlier,
under the stray remarks doctrine a court might exclude or diminish a
discriminatory remark because it was made one year prior to a contested
decision. 56 The underlying inference is that the comment is too far removed in
time to be relevant.
However, there is no stray mistake doctrine that limits negative information
about the plaintiff. Courts regularly allow defendants to produce information
about plaintiffs' mistakes or poor performance years prior to the contested
decision without requiring the employer to tie that evidence to the contested
decision. 57 If the evidence of discrimination loses probative value over time, the
employee's mistakes should also lose probative force, unless the employer

explicitly ties the evidence together (such as in cases involving use of a
documented, progressive discipline policy).
A third unnamed problem occurs in choices judges make when describing
evidence. Judges often fail to fully describe the plaintiff's evidence, while
describing and relying on evidence from the defendant that is contested or
irrelevant. 58 Judges often characterize the plaintiff's evidence as unreliable, even
59
when they allow defendants to rely on similar evidence.
The cumulative weight of both the named doctrines and the unnamed,
invisible manifestations of inequality makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove
their cases. This imbalance often occurs when judges are considering and often
granting employers' motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is a key stage in federal discrimination suits. Litigants

have a right to a jury trial under the federal discrimination statutes, at least under
certain circumstances. 60 Under the federal rule governing summary judgment, a
claim may only be dismissed if no reasonable jury could find in favor of the
nonmoving party. 61 In most employment discrimination cases, the employer is
the party requesting summary judgment. As such, the judge is supposed to

assume that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is true and draw all

56 See, e.g., Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00554, 2013 WL
696424, at *6 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013) (noting "when the remark was made in relation to the
employment decision at issue" as relevant to the stray remarks inquiry).

57 See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Baffa v. STAT Health Immediate Med. Care, P.C., No. 2:11-cv-04709, 2013
WL 5234231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (providing numerous details of defendant's
affidavits with limited reference to plaintiff's affidavits).
59 See infra Section IV.B.
60 42 U.S.C. § 198la(c) (providing the right to a jury trial for complainants seeking
compensatory or punitive damages under Section 1981 a); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (including the

right to a jury trial); see also supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing instances where

a jury trial is not available for employment discrimination claims).
61 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.").
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reasonable inferences in favor of the employee, the nonmoving party.62 Any
disputed facts are read in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of summary
judgment. Most of the time when judges rule on summary judgment motions,

they rule on a paper record and never actually see or hear the parties' witnesses.
Judges are supposed to apply the same evidentiary rules at the summary

judgment stage as they would at trial, with a few exceptions. 63
When used properly, summary judgment serves an important role in

preserving court resources and limiting claims that lack merit. In many cases,
however, the parties heavily contest the facts. Congress has decided that the
proper entity to resolve factual disputes in intentional discrimination cases is the
64
jury.
Some judges have emphasized the importance of allowing cases to go to trial
when the parties contest the facts. They note that judges usually live "in a narrow
segment of the enormously broad American socio-economic

spectrum," and

they generally lack "current real-life experience." 65 They emphasize how
employment discrimination cases "are factually complex, deal with state-of66
mind issues, are typically proved circumstantially, and are rarely uncontested."
Unfortunately, many judges are granting summary judgment by favoring the

employer's evidence and disfavoring the worker's evidence. This practice
directly contravenes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.67
II.

TIME

Time plays an important role in evidentiary inequality. Judges often allow
employers to present evidence spanning a longer time frame while limiting the

time frame for the plaintiffs' evidence. Courts regularly admit defendants'
evidence of an employee's alleged poor performance or misconduct over periods

of years. Courts will often allow defendants to pull together evidence to create a
"history" of employee misconduct. 68

Time works differently when it comes to plaintiffs' evidence. When plaintiffs
try to rely on a history of good performance, judges often exclude or diminish

this evidence. While employee misconduct or poor performance appears to
remain relevant in perpetuity, a worker's good performance seems to have a

62

Cf Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining the standard for

summary judgment as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
63 For example, a party is not required to reduce all information to an admissible form at

summary judgment. Straka v. Comcast Cable, 897 F. Supp. 2d 346, 360 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
That being said, information may only be considered if it is likely that the information can be
reduced to admissible evidence at trial. Id.
" In 1991, Congress explicitly added a provision to Title VII to provide a right to jury trial

in some instances. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
65 Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998).
67

Gertner, supra note 9, at 113.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

68

See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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short shelf life. 69 Judges will sometimes go as far as deeming such past
performance to be completely irrelevant. 70
Courts also regularly exclude plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory or
retaliatory conduct if it is years, and sometimes even months, removed from the
contested actions. 7 1 The relevant time period for employer bad acts is
extraordinarily limited, and courts often refuse to see this evidence as tied to a
history of discriminatory or retaliatory conduct.
I am not arguing that a judge must deem all plaintiffs' evidence relevant, no
matter how old. Instead, as discussed later in the Article, judges should be
evaluating evidence consistent with the demands of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. For example, in most cases, if a
plaintiff tries to rely on a good evaluation that predates the contested action by
five years, this evaluation likely has minimal relevance under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401.72 According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the
employer files a motion for summary judgment, the judge would consider
whether a reasonable jury could draw a favorable inference from such evidence
to favor the worker. 73
Unfortunately, as described throughout this Article, courts are using named
doctrines and unnamed concepts to restrict plaintiffs' evidence in ways that are
not consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 401 or the summary judgment
standard. At the same time, courts often credit an employer's evidence without
imposing the same limits. Just as a five-year-old positive evaluation likely has
minimal relevance to support a plaintiff's case, a five-year-old negative
evaluation likely has minimal relevance to the employer's case, unless the
employer can tie it to the contested action. The way the courts apply these

evidentiary doctrines is asymmetrical.
Employer's Evidence

A.

Employers often defend discrimination cases by producing evidence that the
plaintiff performed poorly, engaged in misconduct, or did not possess the skills
or temperament for a job. This evidence is used in the second and third stages of
the McDonnell Douglas framework. 74 During discovery in discrimination cases,
69

II.B.3.

See infra Section

See, e.g., Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 693 F. App'x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017).
71 See infra Section II.B.2.
71

72 FED. R. EvFD. 401.

73 FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a).
74 Some courts mistakenly view this evidence as part of the prima facie case when
evaluating whether the plaintiff met the qualifications for the position. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Oak

Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 860 F.3d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 2017) (taking employer's
evidence of plaintiff's job performance into account when determining whether plaintiff met

her employer's expectations). This prong of the prima facie case only requires the plaintiff to
meet the minimum objective qualifications of the job. See Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy
Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014) (criticizing lower courts for making plaintiff-
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employers have an additional incentive to find out about past employee
misconduct and other issues because of the "after-acquired evidence" doctrine.
Under this doctrine, an employer can avoid certain types of relief (such as
reinstatement), if it can establish that it would have fired the employee for past
conduct, even if it first found out about the conduct during discovery. 75
Judges often allow employers to present evidence that spans months, years,
and even different decades. 76 Examples include the following:
"

Recounting evidence of the plaintiff's performance from 1992 for a
contested termination in 2000, thus allowing the employer to recount
performance evidence over an eight-yearperiod; 77

"

Reciting performance deficiencies in otherwise satisfactory
performance reviews from 1996 and 1998 when the challenged
employment action occurred in 2003;78

"

Allowing the employer to present evidence of plaintiffs poor
performance from three different supervisors over three different
years;79

"

Allowing an employer that terminated an employee in 2011 to defend
the case by using performance reviews going back to 2005, about six

years prior to the challenged action; 80
"

Reciting performance issues over a thirteen-yearperiod; 81

employees satisfy a higher burden than is required, which is simply performing at a level that
meets the employer's "objective minimum qualifications"). Subjective evidence of employee
performance should be considered later in the framework. See Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv.,

Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining particular skills are subjective and
"cannot be considered in evaluating a plaintiff's qualifications" as part of prima facie case).
75 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 355, 361-63 (1995)
(prohibiting reinstatement and limiting plaintiff's recovery of backpay).
76 See, e.g., D'Alessandro v. City of Newark, 454 F. App'x 53, 55 (3d Cir. 2011) (allowing
evidence spanning over four years and from multiple supervisors); Robinson v. Mondelez

Int'l, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 448, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (allowing evidence for defense dating
back several years); Cunningham v. Fla. Credit Union, No. 5:16-cv-00024, 2017 WL
6610886, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2017) (accounting for performance issues spanning more

than one year); Shade v. Alfa Laval Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00813, 2017 WL 839456, at * 11 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 3, 2017) (using evidence of a verbal warning and a second written warning even
though they were eight months apart); King v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 8:08-cv-03393,
2009 WL 3681686, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 2, 2009) (recounting evidence of performance issues

over two years); Berini v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034-37 (E.D.
Mo. 2006) (reviewing years of performance evaluations offered by the employer).

Silver v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts., 212 F. App'x 82, 84-85 (3d Cir. 2006).
Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App'x 761, 763 (10th Cir. 2007).
79 Truesdale v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01373, 2017 WL 4182327, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 21, 2017).
80 Basil v. CC Servs., Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 880, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
8i Jeffrey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00531, 2019 WL 2122989,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2019).
77
78
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"

Accepting the employer's use of performance evaluations going back
to 2003, a period of eight years before termination of employee during
82
2011 reduction in force;

"

Relying on employer evidence from performance reviews and
83
coworker complaints from four years prior to the contested decision;
Allowing the employer to rely on evidence of plaintiff's performance

"

84
over an eight-yearperiod;

Recounting negative comments in performance reviews from the late
1990s for a case in which the employee-plaintiff was terminated in
2006;85 and
" Recounting performance problems in 2000 for an adverse action that
occurred in 2012, a period of twelve years.86
Courts also recount alleged misconduct or poor performance without
providing the date on which it happened. 87
Sometimes, courts weave plaintiffs' alleged misconduct together and describe
it as a "history" of misconduct or poor performance. In one case, a court
recounted that while a worker was generally a dependable worker, he "had a
88
history" of damaging the defendant's equipment. When the court actually
described the "history," it consisted of two incidents over two years and another
89
incident where a piece of equipment broke while the plaintiff was driving it.
In another case, the court described the plaintiff's work history as "marked by
90
various co-worker complaints, discipline, and written warnings." In some
"

Castro v. Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., 903 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
83 Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., No. 1:07-cv-00657, 2008 WL 11407269, at
*2-8 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2008), report andrecommendation adopted, No. 1:07-cv-00657, 2008
82

WL 11407343 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008).
84 Eib v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00277, 2019 WL 3774234, at *7 (N.D. Ind.
Aug. 12, 2019).
85 Fuller v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235 (D. Colo. 2009).
86 Chew v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 714 F. App'x 687, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2017).
87 See, e.g., Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
plaintiff had once received a verbal warning but not providing date of warning); Ploscowe v.

Kadant, 121 F. App'x 67, 75 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that performance reviews and testimony
from coworkers indicated problems with interpersonal skills but not stating when problems

occurred); Fuller, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (not listing the date for several performance
reviews).

Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1206.
89 Id.
90 Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., No. 1:07-cv-00657, 2008 WL 11407269, at
*2 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2008), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:07-cv-00657, 2008
WL 11407343 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008).
88
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cases, the court labels the plaintiff as having a "history" of problems but never
describes the history. 9 1

As described throughout this Article, judges often use named doctrines to
limit plaintiffs' evidence. 92 There is no named doctrine that limits an employer's
ability to present negative evidence about the plaintiff, even when that evidence
relates to events that occurred years before the contested employment action and
even when the employer fails to tie it to the contested action. In other words,
there is no stray mistake doctrine that limits the employer's ability to submit
evidence related to an employee's poor performance.
Judges rarely place any time limits on evidence related to a plaintiff's alleged
misconduct or poor performance. 93 Courts will even recount issues with a
plaintiff's performance, even though the employer promoted the plaintiff after
those issues. 94
B.

Worker's Evidence

In relation to time, courts often treat plaintiffs' evidence differently than
defendants' evidence in three different ways. First, courts often severely limit
the evidence that a plaintiff can present about discriminatory words or conduct. 95
In many instances, courts have excluded or diminished a worker's evidence of
discrimination because it occurred months before the challenged employment
decision. 96 Second, courts severely restrict how plaintiffs can use inferences that
might be drawn from the temporal proximity of a discriminatory or retaliatory

action and the challenged employment decision. 97 Finally, many courts are
unwilling to draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff when the plaintiff has a
history of good performance. 98 While any performance infractions (even minor

91 See Ploscowe v. Kadant, 121 F. App'x 67, 70 (6th Cir. 2005) (using phrase "history of
poor performance" without describing poor performance).
92 See supra Part I.B.
93 For an example of a court placing such a limit, see Altman v. New Rochelle Pub. Sch.

Dist., No. 7:13-cv-03253, 2017 WL 66326, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017) (noting that
employer had not shown how prior evaluations were connected to contested decision).

94 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Cardi v. MMM Holdings, Inc., 936 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2019)
(noting promotion "[d]espite the concerns expressed in the evaluation"); Peele v. Country

Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing promotion "in spite of the recent
drop in her performance rating").
95 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Eli Lilly & Co., 820 F.3d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 2016) (categorizing

as stray remark comment made four months before challenged decision).
96 See, e.g., Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015)
(noting six-month lapse between plaintiff's EEO complaints and adverse employment action).
97 See, e.g., Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding that eighteen-month lapse between protected activity and adverse employment action
did not give rise to an inference of causation).

98

See, e.g., Farias v. Great Lakes Credit Union, No. 1:15-cv-11515, 2018 WL 827952, at

*4 (N.D. 111. Feb. 9, 2018) (noting that positive reviews two months prior to termination did
not outweigh the negative reviews leading up to plaintiff's termination).
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ones that took place in the distant past) count toward the narrative that the
plaintiff is a poor performer, the plaintiff's history of good performance often
counts for very little, even when combined with other evidence.
1.

Limited Palette of Discriminatory Evidence

In many discrimination cases, a worker tries to present evidence of
discriminatory words or conduct. Courts routinely diminish or exclude evidence
of discriminatory actions or words if the words or actions occurred outside of a
fairly limited time frame. 99
For example, courts have refused to consider the following as evidence of
discrimination based on temporal proximity concerns: 100
"

In an age discrimination case, statements made by supervisors in the
months leading up to the plaintiff's termination that "the young guns
are kicking your butt" and asking on more than one occasion, "Are you
getting to [sic] old to perform this job?"101

"

In a race and national origin discrimination case, a question by a human
resources professional that "[i]f you don't like it here, why don't you
go back to Ethiopia" was not probative of discrimination because of an
102
eight-month time gap.

"

In an age discrimination case, the following comments made four
months before termination were considered to be stray remarks: "you
know, the job is changing"; "a person from your era wouldn't have the

"

type of analytical skills that we require"; "things are different today";
and "the skills needed today are typically of a younger sales
manager."1 03
In an age discrimination case, comments that the plaintiff was "old and
antiquated and need[s] to go" made ten months before decision were
stray remarks.1 04

99 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 820 F.3d at 764; Martin v. City Univ. of N.Y., No.

1:17-cv-06791,

2018 WL 6510805, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018) (disregarding comments made ten
months prior to termination); Moore v. Verizon, No. 1:13-cv-06467, 2016 WL 825001, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2016) (denoting remarks made almost one year prior to termination as "non-

actionable stray remarks").
100 Throughout the Article, I reference the evidence that workers and employers present.
instances, the evidence is contested. In this Article, I am not making any claims about

In many

the veracity of any individual piece of evidence.
101 Hasemann v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00554, 2013 WL 696424,
at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2013).
102 Legendre v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 1:94-cv-02911, 1996 WL 514874, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1996) (alteration in original).
103 Testa v. CareFusion, 305 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
104 Ortiz v. Cedar Crest Coll., No. 5:16-cv-06703, 2017 WL 6422164, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
18, 2017) (alteration in original).
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In an age discrimination case, a statement that the supervisor wanted
to get rid of the older employees and hire "young blood" was not
probative because it was made two years prior to termination.1 05

"

In a race discrimination case, a supervisor's comment that the
employer had "a problem ... with past black coaches" and that the
supervisor "would do his best to get rid of' the plaintiff "if there was
another problem" was a stray remark when it was made nearly a year

before the decision not to renew the plaintiff's contract.1 06
"

In a reverse discrimination case, statements by supervisors that
"Asians work better" and "[t]hey don't complain" were stray remarks
when made a year before termination.107

The timing concerns can also arise in cases in which plaintiffs try to present

evidence that non-supervisors made comments that might show bias.1 08
Additionally, at times it is difficult to understand how much time has elapsed
because the court does not describe the amount of time and then dismisses the
allegedly discriminatory comments as irrelevant.' 09
One key insight of this Article is that the courts have often created formal,
named doctrines to limit the plaintiffs' evidence." 0 The stray remarks doctrine
is one of those doctrines. When considering temporal proximity, the stray
remarks doctrine often places an expiration date on the plaintiff's evidence of
discriminatory words or conduct. According to the courts, this evidence does not
carry any probative weight after a period of time.

This is in sharp contrast to how courts treat employers' evidence of workers'
misconduct or poor performance. Courts routinely allow employers to rely on
evidence of an employee's poor performance over lengthy periods of time. No

formal, named doctrine limits an employer's ability to present evidence. Judges
regularly dismiss or diminish the plaintiff's evidence based on concerns that the
passage of time decreases the probative value of the evidence to show
discrimination or retaliation. Judges rarely make similar judgments about the

passage of time related to the evidence that favors the employer.

105 Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997).
106 Auguster v. Vermilion Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 404-05 (5th Cir. 2001) (alteration
in original).
107 Stites v. Alan Ritchey, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00392, 2011 WL 81076, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan.

10, 2011) (alteration in original).
108 See, e.g., Paul v. Postgraduate Ctr. for Mental Health, 97 F. Supp. 3d 141, 169
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that comments made by coworkers that the plaintiff could not be
the boss because he was old and Haitian were stray remarks in part because of ten-month time

gap).
109

See, e.g., Straka v. Comcast Cable, 897 F. Supp. 2d 346, 362 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (finding

that age-related statements made by plaintiffs prior supervisor were not probative and not

describing time between comments and plaintiff's termination).
11o See supra Section

I.B.

2126
2.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 101:2105

Temporal Proximity

In some cases, plaintiffs try to rely on evidence of temporal proximity to
establish discrimination or retaliation. A plaintiff may rely on evidence of
temporal proximity between the plaintiff's protected conduct and a negative
outcome to establish retaliation." For example, in some retaliation cases, a
plaintiff tries to establish her case by showing that she engaged in a protected
activity and that shortly thereafter, the employer took an adverse action against
her. In the discrimination context, a plaintiff might try to establish a short time
period between the employer's knowledge of a protected trait and an adverse
action.11 2 For example, a plaintiff might argue that her employer terminated her
shortly after learning about a pregnancy or learning about a disability.
Often, courts will reject a plaintiff's temporal proximity evidence, finding that
the time between the two events is too long to create an inference of
discrimination or retaliation. 1 3 If a plaintiff relies on temporal proximity alone,
courts typically require the plaintiff to show that the negative outcome happened
a short time after the protected activity or the employer's knowledge of the
protected trait. 1 4 Even when the plaintiff is relying on temporal proximity and

"I See, e.g., Buchanan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 727 F. App'x 639, 642 (11th Cir. 2018)
(holding that "temporal proximity alone cannot establish causation"); Garcia v. City of
Everett, 728 F. App'x 624, 628 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Courts have held 'very close' temporal
proximity to mean that 1.5 months is sufficient whereas three and four months is too long.");

Garcia-Garcia v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 878 F.3d 411, 426 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of presenting evidence of employer's retaliatory animus,
even though in other cases temporal proximity could have otherwise been sufficient); Spector

v. District of Columbia, No. 1:17-cv-01884, 2020 WL 977983, at *12 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2020)
(noting seven-month period that followed plaintiff's report to Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission and plaintiff's reclassification).
112 See, e.g., Rosencrans v. Quixote Enters., Inc., 755 F. App'x 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2018)
(calling it "of significance" that there was only one day in between employer telling boss that
she got married and termination of her employment); Baker v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of San Diego, 725 F. App'x 531, 533 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that there was a triable issue
where employee's employment contract was not renewed five months after she had

concussion); Hester v. Ind. State Dep't of Health, 726 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2013) (calling
"suspicious timing" an "example[] of pertinent circumstantial evidence").
113 See, e.g., Sklyarsky v. Means-Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015)

(six-month lapse between plaintiffs EEOC complaints and adverse employment action);
Musolf v. J.C. Penney Co., 773 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2014) (seven months); Villiarimo v.
Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A nearly 18-month lapse
between protected activity and an adverse employment action is simply too long, by itself, to
give rise to an inference of causation."); Coleman v. Home Health Res. Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d
935, 945 (D. Ariz. 2017) (eight months is too long).
114 See, e.g., Rasmy v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 379, 391 (2d Cir. 2020) (five-month
gap may establish pretext in some cases); Bentley v. AutoZoners, LLC, 935 F.3d 76, 90 (2d
Cir. 2019) (one-month gap is not sufficient); Parron v. Herbert, 768 F. App'x 75, 77 (2d Cir.
2019) (timing alone is not sufficient); Garcia, 728 F. App'x at 628 (noting that one-and-ahalf months is sufficient, but three months is not); Molden v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd.,

2021 ]

EVIDENTIARY INEQUALITY

2127

additional evidence, courts often do not allow plaintiffs to rely on temporal
proximity if the time exceeds several months. Some courts have stated that
temporal proximity inferences dissipate after three months or even shorter time
frames. 1 5
Some courts have drawn strange divisions related to temporal proximity. For

example, the Fifth Circuit has explained that if a plaintiff is solely relying on
evidence of temporal proximity, a four-month gap could be sufficient to
establish a causal connection, but a five-month gap is not probative.1 16
Additionally, the circuits are inconsistent in how they apply temporal proximity

limits. The Eleventh Circuit has held that when standing alone, evidence of a
four-month gap between protected activity and an adverse action is not sufficient
17
This appears to contradict the four-month line drawn
to establish causation.?
by the Fifth Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit has rejected a temporal proximity argument based on a
three-month gap'1 8 and in one case a gap of fifty-eight days.1 19 The Eleventh
Circuit has even suggested that a gap of two weeks might not be probative.1 10
Judges severely limit the time frame in which they are willing to infer a

connection between a plaintiff's protected activity and an adverse action. And
they similarly limit the inferences they are willing to draw based on an
employer's knowledge of a plaintiff's protected class and an adverse action. At
the same time, judges routinely infer that employees are "bad employees" based
on evidence far removed in time from the contested action.
Strangely, courts have not described why they have drawn lines about
temporal proximity and limited its inferential value to a certain number of
months. The limits do not appear to be based on any empirical study of jury

715 F. App'x 310, 318 (5th Cir. 2017) (fourteen months is too long); Moody v. At. City Bd.
of Educ., 870 F.3d 206, 221 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding inferences that can be drawn from
temporal proximity dissipate after three months); see also D'Andrea v. Nielsen, 765 F. App'x

602, 605-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (collecting cases regarding temporal proximity). It is not clear how
courts are determining the time period from which a reasonable jury might infer retaliation.
"5 See, e.g., Bentley, 935 F.3d at 90 (one-month gap is not sufficient); Moody, 870 F.3d at
221 (holding inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity dissipate after three

months); Kilby-Robb v. Devos, 247 F. Supp. 3d

115, 129 (D.D.C. 2017) (temporal proximity

must be less than three months); Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 113 F. Supp. 3d

297, 311 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that three months is perceived as the outer limit).
116 Aguillard v. La. Coll., 824 F. App'x 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2020).
"7 McConico v. City of Tampa, 823 F. App'x 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2020).

"8 Gilliam v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 822 F. App'x 985, 990 (11th Cir. 2020) (calling
three-month period "too long to permit an inference of causation based on temporal proximity

alone").
"19 Johnson v. Miami-Dade County, 948 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that
much shorter timelines were held insufficient in the past).
120 Id. at 1328 (describing two-week period as "probably insufficient" (quoting Hurlbert v.

St. Mary's Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006))).
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verdicts or any other evidence about the likely impact of engaging in protected
activity or making a protected status known. 121
There is nothing in the text of the employment discrimination statutes or
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that limit a plaintiff's ability to rely
on temporal proximity. Indeed, at summary judgment, the question for the court
is whether a reasonable jury could find discrimination or retaliation based on the
proffered evidence. 122 Courts also have not explained why they can infer that
poor performance or misconduct is probative even years after it occurred, while
evidence favoring the plaintiff is only relevant for extraordinarily short periods
of time.
3.

History of Good Performance

Courts also limit plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate their good performance
over time. If employers can rely on a "history" of bad performance to defend
cases, it seems that workers should be able to rely on a "history" of good
performance to support their cases, especially in certain circumstances.

A history of good performance could be relevant in many different ways. A
plaintiff might want to rely on a history of good performance to establish that
she was qualified for her job, which is the second factor of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case. 123 If an employer asserts that it fired an employee for
a history of poor performance, the plaintiff should be able to counter the
employer's evidence by showing she performed well over time. If the employer
fired the plaintiff abruptly or for a minor offense, the plaintiff might want to
124
show that the employer's stated reason is not the likely reason for its action.
The plaintiff's good performance may establish that the employer's stated reason
is pretextual, which is one of the inquiries in the third step of the McDonnell
Douglas framework.
The plaintiff might want to compare her history of performance against the
performance of other similarly situated workers. Or, the plaintiff might want to
show that when a new supervisor started, that supervisor began downgrading the
plaintiff's performance and that the new supervisor might view her performance
differently because of a protected trait. 125 These are some ways in which a
plaintiff's history of good performance might be relevant to a discrimination
claim. Despite the recognition by some judges that these inferences can play a

21 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REv. 18, 78 (2005).
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
123 See, e.g., Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014)

(twenty-five-year employment with company sufficient to establish employee qualifications).
124 See, e.g., Halliwell v. N. White Sch. Corp., No. 4:13-cv-00084, 2016 WL 795893, at
*2 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 1, 2016) (agreeing with plaintiff that his proffered evidence of school
recharacterizing his performance was relevant).
125 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-05 (1993) (alleging similar fact
pattern).
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valid role in discrimination cases, in many cases judges limit plaintiffs' ability
to present such evidence.
Examples of courts limiting the time frame for the plaintiff's evidence of good
performance include the following:
"

Refusing to draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff when the plaintiff
received good evaluations less than one year prior to a demotion;1 26

"

Indicating that a performance review given in January was not relevant
to whether the plaintiff was performing well in August of that year;' 27

"

Stating that a June performance review finding that the employee met
the employer's expectations was not relevant to a termination in
August of the same year; 128

"

Refusing to consider positive performance reviews from 2014 and
2015 for a termination in June 2016;129

"

Noting that positive reviews received two months before a contested
action did not establish that the plaintiff was performing her job
satisfactorily; 130

"

Holding that reviews received seven months before a contested
decision were not probative in proving the plaintiff met her employer's

legitimate expectations; 13 1 and

126 Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1999)
(declining to make inference most favorable to nonmoving plaintiff during summary
judgment when finding that juror could not infer the plaintiff met expectations at one job
based on positive evaluations from prior supervisor); see also Avant v. S. Md. Hosp., Inc.,

No. 8:13-cv-02989, 2015 WL 435011, at *5 (D. Md. Feb. 2, 2015) (holding that positive
review from person who supervised plaintiff nine months before termination was too removed
from the time of termination to be relevant). But see Lewis v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No.

1:06-cv-00058, 2007 WL 1100422, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2007) (finding evaluations
relevant when they preceded adverse action by eight weeks).
27 O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd on
other grounds, 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
28 McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.
Dec. 15, 2011) (considering the negative, but not positive, aspects of a review prior to

termination), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2012 WL 714632

(D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
129 Dinda v. CSC Gov't Sols., LLC, No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL 4280370, at *8 (D.S.C.
Mar. 21, 2019) (noting only relevant performance is performance at time of termination),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL 3244186 (D.S.C. July 19,

2019). But see Mitter v. County of DuPage, No. 1:13-cv-00841, 2017 WL 345538, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 24, 2017) (holding prior good performance could help plaintiff establish pretext).
130 Farias v. Great Lakes Credit Union, No. 1:15-cv-11515, 2018 WL 827952, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 9, 2018) (noting that positive reviews two months prior to termination did not

outweigh the negative reviews leading up to plaintiff's termination).
13' Hess v. Atl. Marine Corps Cmtys. Prop. Mgmt., LLC, No. 7:13-cv-00018, 2014 WL

1321001, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 1, 2014).
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Indicating that an evaluation five months before the contested decision
was not relevant. 132

Even when courts recount the full history of the plaintiff's good performance,
they often appear to infer more from negative comments in otherwise good
133
In some
performance reviews than they infer from the positive comments.
instances, courts state that the plaintiff received a good performance review but
then focus only on the negative aspects of the review without discussing the
positive aspects. 134
At times, courts diminish or refuse to consider evidence that a plaintiff has a
long history of favorable performance under one supervisor and then faced
35
In one case, a
immediate poor performance reviews by a new supervisor.1

plaintiff presented evidence that he worked for a company for eighteen years
"primarily without any major performance issues."1 36 The plaintiff, who was
legally blind, claimed that a new supervisor overly criticized his performance
and then fired him.1 37 The court refused to credit this evidence as supporting a
claim of disability discrimination.1 38 The plaintiff's history of good performance
under other supervisors did not count as a reason to be suspicious about the new
supervisor's reports of poor performance.1 39 Instead of inferring discrimination
from this evidence, courts often conclude new supervisors have different,
legitimate standards and that the new supervisor's criticism is
nondiscriminatory.1

40

Courts justify these restrictions in different ways. Numerous ideas work either
individually or in tandem to exclude or diminish plaintiffs' evidence. For lack
of a defined term, I refer to them as the "decisionmaker at the time" doctrines.
These doctrines limit the inferences courts are willing to draw in favor of the

132 Stern v. St. Anthony's Health Ctr., No. 3:12-cv-00785, 2013 WL 5967746, at *5 (S.D.

Ill. Nov. 8, 2013).
1" See, e.g., Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App'x 761, 763-65 (10th Cir.
2007) (recounting plaintiff's performance history but focusing
comments).

attention on negative

134 McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.
Dec. 15, 2011) (focusing on one negative performance aspect rather than otherwise
satisfactory performance), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2012

WL 714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
13 Carroll v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00414, 2015 WL 1487098, at *1 (N.D. Ala.
Mar. 30, 2015) (finding the manager who suggested termination was the dispositive source of
evidence, not the previous managers). But see Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:11-cv-00193,
2012 WL 5467759, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2012) (allowing this kind of evidence).
136 Carroll, 2015 WL 1487098, at *1.
137 Id
138 Id. at *7
139 Id
140 See, e.g., Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Different supervisors
may impose different standards of behavior, and a new supervisor may decide to enforce
policies that a previous supervisor did not consider important.").
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plaintiff if the evidence does not come from (1) a decisionmaker (2) at the time
of the contested action. This Section focuses on the temporal aspects of this idea.
The second factor in the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case requires the

plaintiff to establish that she met the employer's qualifications. 14 1 Some courts
increase the burden of the plaintiff in this second step and require the plaintiff to
present evidence that she was meeting her employer's expectations at the time
of the contested decision.1 42 The court will then limit the plaintiff's ability to
present evidence of the plaintiff's good performance over time.1 43
Courts draw these limits differently depending on whether the plaintiff or
defendant is offering evidence. In one case, a plaintiff was terminated in April
of 2004.144 The plaintiff tried to establish the second factor of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case by showing that she had a history of positive reviews,
including a positive review at the end of 2001 and a bonus she received in
December of 2003.145 The court rejected this evidence because the "relevant
inquiry is whether the employee was meeting expectations at the time of
termination." 46 However, in the very next sentence, the court discussed
evidence that the employer offered to show the plaintiff was not meeting its
expectations.1 47 This proffered evidence detailed that:
[t]he performance reviews received by the plaintiff during her final three
years at the bank show that the plaintiff's managers felt that she was

'4' Bulifant v. Del. River & Bay Auth., 698 F. App'x 660, 663 (3d Cir. 2017); Loyd v.
Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014) ("[A] plaintiff can satisfy the
qualification prong [of the McDonnell Douglas framework] by showing that she performed
at a level that generally met her employer's objective minimum qualifications.").

142 Berini v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2006)
(finding that the awarding of bonuses does not prove work was satisfactory when awarded

near termination). But see Angelone v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP, No. 2:05-cv-02106, 2007 WL
1033458, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2007) (indicating that because some people plaintiff worked
for thought her work was satisfactory, she could meet the second factor to establish prima
facie case).

"I McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.
Dec. 15, 2011) (finding plaintiff's evidence of positive reviews prior to termination were
irrelevant to termination), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2012 WL

714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 462 (4th Cir. 2012); Berini, 420 F. Supp.
2d at 1037 ("She also emphasizes her long tenure at the bank and the positive evaluations,
promotions and raises that she received during the majority of that time. However, in
evaluating whether an employee's job performance is satisfactory, the relevant inquiry is
whether the employee was meeting expectations at the time of termination."). The courts are
inconsistent on this prong of McDonnell Douglas. Machinchick v. PB Power, Inc., 398 F.3d

345, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2005) (allowing plaintiff to rely on evidence of past performance
reviews to establish this prong).
"44

Berini, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.

145 Id. at 1037.
146 Id.

147 Id. (highlighting evidence of performance reviews dating back three years from
termination).
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making an unacceptable number of errors, that she had not managed to
learn the skills required by the new accounting methodologies, and that she
14 8
was made aware of these shortcomings.
The court did not allow the plaintiff to present evidence from 2001 to 2003 to

support her case because it was not "at the time of termination," but it allowed
49
the employer to use evidence from the same period to support its defense.1
50
This happens repeatedly.1 In another case, the plaintiff offered his June 2008
performance review as evidence that he met the expectations for the job.151 The
employer had rated the employee as mostly meeting expectations in June but
52
fired the employee less than two months later in August.1 The court stated that
the June review was irrelevant as to whether the plaintiff was meeting
expectations in August and that the only relevant time period was at the time of
termination.1 53 However, then the court noted that negative comments in the
same performance review supported the employer's decision to terminate the
plaintiff.1 54 The court found the evidence from the review that supported the
plaintiff's case irrelevant, while deeming relevant evidence from the same
review that supported the employer.
When analyzing pretext evidence under the third step of McDonnell Douglas,
courts have reasoned that if the employer articulates a specific reason for
terminating the plaintiff, plaintiff's evidence of good performance in other areas
55
At times, courts state that the only relevant
is not probative of pretext.1

performance is the plaintiffs performance at the time of the challenged
employment action.1 56 Courts also reason that if the plaintiff has changed jobs
148 Id.

149 Id.
"' See, e.g., Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059643,
at *4-5 (D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2010) (plaintiff required to present evidence at the time of the contested
action, but the defendant was allowed to support its case with reviews from a prior supervisor),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059639 (D.S.C. Dec. 6,

2010).

151 McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.
Dec. 15, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2012 WL 714632
(D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012), aff'd, 475 F. App'x 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
152 Id. at *1 ("Approximately two months prior to his termination, [plaintiff] received an
overall performance review rating of 'M,' signifying that he was meeting expectations ....
[Plaintiff also] received an 'I' with regard to his performance and achievements, denoting that
he needed improvement in some important areas.").
153 Id. at *4.
1s4 Id

I Connearney v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-02730, 2016 WL 6569326, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2016) (finding nurse could not show firing was pretextual by introducing
positive letters of recommendation when employer had alleged she was terminated for

falsifying a record).
156 Sargis v. Amoco Corp., 996 F. Supp. 790, 793-94 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (finding positive
reviews did not prove pretext when employer articulated it fired plaintiff for not meeting goals
and making errors).
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or changed supervisors in the intervening time, then the evaluations of past
supervisors are irrelevant.1 57

If courts place these limits on the plaintiff's evidence, it is unclear why they
often refuse to similarly limit the employer's evidence. As discussed below,
courts regularly allow employers to present evidence from prior supervisors and
former coworkers as to the plaintiff's performance and do not limit this evidence
to information the employer considered at the time the employer took the
contested action.
III.

WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS

Evidentiary inequality also exists in the way judges treat witnesses and
documents in discrimination cases. Judges allow employers to provide evidence
from a broad group of people and regularly admit employer evidence derived
from a variety of documents, including past performance reviews.' 5 8 When
considering evidence of a plaintiff's misconduct, poor performance, or lack of
qualifications, courts do not regularly require that this evidence come from the

person who made the contested decision or even require that the person who
made the decision knew about the evidence or considered it at the time the
decision was made. 159
In contrast, judges often severely restrict the people from whom the plaintiff

can provide evidence and the documents on which plaintiffs may rely. Judges
will often exclude or diminish a plaintiff's evidence about her performance if
the evidence does not come from her supervisor at the time of the contested
employment action.1 60 Additionally, judges will prohibit the plaintiff from using
evidence about how well the plaintiff performed her job or offering testimony

' See, e.g., Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1999)
(finding that plaintiff's positive reviews from prior supervisors were not dispositive in
demotion claim).
158

See, e.g., Ralser v. Hudson Grp. (HG) Retail, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-01359, 2020 WL

94878, at *9 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2020) (noting unfavorable parts of a performance review by

plaintiffs former supervisor); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2010)
(relying on reviews from multiple prior supervisors, many unrelated to challenged action).

"' Nagpal, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27 (citing negative reviews from individuals other than
the decisionmaker at the time).

160 See, e.g., Lindeman v. Saint Luke's Hosp. of Kansas City, 899 F.3d 603, 606 (8th Cir.
2018) (diminishing importance of reviews by prior supervisors); Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,

693 F. App'x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding evidence of good job performance by plaintiff
is not relevant when provided by coworkers and former supervisors); Dinda v. CSC Gov't
Sols. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL 3244186, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2019) ("He only
provided positive performance reviews from former supervisors, as well as positive feedback
from some of his clients. However, Dinda failed to provide positive performance reviews
from his supervisor at the time of his termination." (citation omitted)), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL 3244186 (D.S.C. July 19, 2019);
Weinerth v. Martinsville City Sch. Bd., No. 4:17-cv-00067, 2019 WL 2181931, at *9 (W.D.
Va. May 20, 2019) (finding that review from prior supervisor was not relevant).
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from prior supervisors or coworkers that the plaintiff was not responsible for
performance issues claimed by the defendant.16 1
The Employer's Witnesses and Documents

A.

Judges routinely allow employers to present evidence of a plainitiff's poor
performance or lack of credentials from a number of individuals. Judges accept
163
and customers. 6 4
this evidence from former supervisors, 162 coworkers,
161

Martin v. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 67 F. App'x 109, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding

that overall good performance reviews did not outweigh specific negative accusations);

Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The mere
submission of materials from a coworker or supervisor indicating that an employee's
performance is satisfactory, or more specifically that an employee's performance is
satisfactory because he was not entirely responsible for several admitted mishaps, does not
create a material issue of fact."); Brenner v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Educ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 407,
419 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that coworker's affidavits were not appropriate for consideration
at summary judgment stage).

162 See, e.g., Seastrand v. U.S. Bank N.A., 807 Fed. App'x 882, 886-87 (10th Cir. 2020)
(allowing evidence from former supervisor of plaintiff's poor judgment); Sims v. MVM, Inc.,
704 F.3d 1327, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013) (mentioning former supervisor was consulted during
the employer's reduction in force process); Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398

F.3d 469, 490 (6th Cir. 2005) (mentioning a memorandum that described plaintiff's prior
work deficiencies); Ralser, 2020 WL 94878, at *9 (noting unfavorable performance review
by the plaintiffs former supervisor); Robertson v. Riverstone Cmtys., LLC, No. 1:17-cv-

02668, 2019 WL 4399492, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 28, 2019) (discussing performance review
from former supervisor), report andrecommendation adopted, No. 1:17-cv-02668, 2019 WL
3282991 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2019); Nagpal, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 27 (relying on reviews from
multiple prior supervisors, many unrelated to challenged action); Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue

Shield of Ga., No. 1:07-cv-00657, 2008 WL 11407269, at *1-7 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2008)
(recounting complaints from prior supervisors), report and recommendation adopted, No.

1:07-cv-00657, 2008 WL 11407343 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 27, 2008); Ratcliff v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
No. 2:01-cv-02618, 2002 WL 1315625, at *5 (E.D. La. June 13, 2002) (stating that hiring
decisionmakers relied on opinions of plaintiff's former supervisors).
163 Gant v. Genco I, Inc., 274 F. App'x 429, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting numerous
complaints from coworkers); Vasser v. SaarGummi Tenn., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00083, 2019
WL 8013869, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2019) (noting complaints from coworkers); Jeffrey
v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00531, 2019 WL 2122989, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. May 14, 2019) ("Plaintiff's coworkers and supervisors recorded a number of incidents

regarding Plaintiff's behavior, some of which included verbal or written warnings, or resulted
in Plaintiff being removed from certain job responsibilities."); Clark v. N.Y. State Off. of the
State Comptroller, No. 1:09-cv-00716, 2014 WL 823289, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014)
(noting numerous complaints from coworkers); Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp.

3d 589, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (discussing coworker and customer complaints); Georgy v.
O'Neill, No. 1:00-cv-00660, 2002 WL 449723, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2002) (discussing
coworker complaints).
164 See, e.g., Bielich, 6 F. Supp. 3d at 612 (mentioning customer complaints); Chytka v.

Wright Tree Serv., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1167 (D. Colo. 2013) ("[A] supervisor for
... Defendant's largest customer, complained to Defendant about Plaintiff's job
performance .... "); Johnson v. MacDonald, 897 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
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Judges routinely allow employers to present evidence about a plaintiff's
misconduct, poor performance, or lack of skills from people who are not the
decisionmaker.
The following are some examples that provide more context about the type of
people from whom the courts will accept negative evidence about the plaintiff.
In one case, the director of a department made the decision to terminate the
plaintiff. 165 When recounting evidence to support the termination decision, the
court relied on evidence from the plaintiff's immediate supervisor, as well as
"reports and other complaints from the testing lab, and reports from other people
employed by the department."

166

In another case, the judge relied on plaintiffs

performance history from the late 1990s until the plaintiffs termination in 2006
and recounted negative comments from at least five different supervisors, a
coworker, and a non-direct supervisor.1 67
Additional examples of courts allowing employers to rely on evidence from
a wide range of people include the following:
"

Relying on evidence of the plaintiffs communication issues from
multiple coworkers and complaints from two clients about project
management;1 68

"

Allowing evidence that the employer received "multiple and continued
complaints from ... fellow co-workers" about the plaintiff but
rejecting plaintiff's comparator evidence;1 69

"

Holding that summary judgment was appropriate when a company

fired an employee after receiving an anonymous tip that the employee
planned to steal company property, when there was contested evidence

about whether the plaintiff was involved in such a plan;17 0
"

Granting

summary judgment after relying on complaints from

supervisors, maintenance personnel and operators,
"[c]onversations
conduct;17 1

with plant

supervisors"

about

as well as

the

plaintiffs

("Beginning in late May 2009, however, the number of allegations made by customers against

plaintiff increased."); Anderson v. AMC Cancer Rsch. Ctr., No. 1:06-cv-01999, 2009 WL
2219263, at *2 (D. Colo. July 24, 2009) (noting that at least one client requested that plaintiff
be removed from its project).
165 Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002).
166 Id.

167 Fuller v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 651 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1235-37 (D. Colo. 2009).
168 Anderson, 2009 WL 2219263, at *2 (describing employer's testimony regarding
complaints by six coworkers and two clients).
169 Smith v. Eaton Corp., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1094 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
170 Stephens v. Neal's Pallet Co., No. 3:1 1-cv-00173, 2012 WL 2994651, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
July 23, 2012).
171 Zoutomou v. Kennecott Utah Copper, No. 2:10-cv-00719, 2013 WL 1213386, at *2,
*6 (D. Utah Mar. 25, 2013).
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"

Granting summary judgment in part for the employer based on the
employer's evidence that both coworkers and customers complained
about the plaintiff's timeliness, 172 including an employee who did not
173
work in the plaintiff's department;

"

Permitting the employer to base its legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason on a customer complaint received on a website;'
"

74

Recounting customer complaints and negative performance reviews

from multiple supervisors;1 75 and
"

Recommending grant of summary judgment in the employer's favor

when a company terminated an employee based on a process that
76
started with an anonymous complaint about the plaintiff.1
Courts allow employers to present evidence from past performance reviews
and other documents.1 77 Courts also will allow employers to rely on complaints,
even when those complaints were never communicated to the worker during his
employment.1 7 8

Courts even allow employers to use negative comments from otherwise
79
While
positive performance reviews to support their version of events.1

employers should be able to present this evidence to the court, courts should be
careful about what inferences they can draw against the worker from such
evidence.
80
For example, in Berini v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,1 the court
granted summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's claim that her

172 Bielich v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 589, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2014).
173 Id. at 596.
174 Cox v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC, No. 3:14-cv-00679, 2015 WL 7288689, at *1
(W.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2015).
171 Schaffner v. Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Hosp., No. 1:94-cv-02471, 1996 WL
507246, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996).
176 Henderson v. Rite Aid of N.Y., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00785, 2020 WL 7049304, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:16-cv-00785, 2020

WL 5987843 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2020).
177 See, e.g., Schrock v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 653 F. App'x 662, 664 (11th Cir. 2016)
(using record of counseling statements and performance reviews as evidence to grant
summary judgment); Zoutomou v. Kennecott Utah Copper, No. 2:10-cv-00719, 2013 WL

1213386, at *6 (D. Utah Mar. 25, 2013) (using performance reviews, PIP, STIP review, and
deposition documents to support grant of summary judgment); Berini v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of
St. Louis, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (using performance review).
178 See, e.g., Brollosy v. Margolin, Winer & Evens, LLP, No. 2:04-cv-00873, 2006 WL
721433, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2006) (citing cases that hold it is not relevant whether
employer informed employee of problems); Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab, Inc., 383 F.
Supp. 2d 628, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that employer did not tell plaintiff why he was
being fired).
179 Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App'x 761, 763 (10th Cir. 2007).
180 Berini, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030.
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employer terminated her employment in 2004 because of her age.'81 The court

described the plaintiff's performance review from the year 2000 as follows:
At the end of the year, plaintiff received a summary review rating of
"strong," and she was recommended for promotion to grade level 13 by her
immediate supervisor[]. [Her supervisor's] suggestions for improvements

included comments on the tone of plaintiff's written communications, and
a caution that she "sometimes focuses too narrowly on the details and does
not fully consider the broader impact of each action she recommends."' 8 2
Even though the plaintiff received a review so favorable that her supervisor

recommended her for a promotion, the court chose to point out suggestions for
improvement provided in the performance review as supporting the employer's

case.1 83 The court did not recount any positive comments about the plaintiff's
performance from this review. Nor did the court explain how the negative
comments related to the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff's
employment approximately four years later. Even though courts often require
the plaintiff to show how evidence connects to the contested decision, they do
not frequently require an employer to connect the evidence from its witnesses
and documents to the contested employment action or to explain why the
evidence is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.184
B.

The Worker's Witnesses and Documents
A strange thing often happens when the plaintiff tries to present evidence of

her good performance or evidence suggesting discriminatory remarks or
conduct. The courts will use a variety of doctrines to exclude or diminish
plaintiffs' evidence.
1.

Limited Palette of Discriminatory Evidence

As discussed earlier, a court might use the stray remarks doctrine to exclude
a piece of evidence that favors the plaintiff by reasoning that it is too far removed
in time from the contested decision to be relevant. Courts also will use this
doctrine to limit the plaintiffs' evidence because the person who made the
remarks or engaged in the conduct is not the decisionmaker related to the
contested action.
In one case, the court granted summary judgment for the employer on the
plaintiff's age discrimination claim. 185 The court rejected plaintiff's evidence
that his direct supervisor called him "the old man in the group," referred to him

181 Id at 1035 (granting summary judgment and finding plaintiff failed to provide any
evidence that defendant's reason for firing her was pretextual).

182 Id. (footnote omitted).
183 Id.
184 FED. R. EvID. 401.
185 Connolly v. Pepsi Bottling Grp., L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-01462, 2008 WL 4412090, at *1
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2008). The court also discussed other stray remarks cases. Id. at *12-14.
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as an "old man," and said he "could hire two or three people" for the money the
plaintiff made.1 86 The court held these comments were stray remarks because
even though the person who made them was a supervisor and investigated the
plaintiff's conduct, that person did not make the ultimate decision to fire the
plaintiff.187 The court also rejected evidence that one of the decisionmakers told
the plaintiff "the job has passed [you] by" and "younger key account managers
can work rings around you." 188 The court reasoned that the remarks by one of
the decisionmakers was a stray remark because the person was one member of
1 89
a five-member group who made the decision to terminate the plaintiff.
In another case, a court deemed the following comments by managers to be
stray remarks in a sex and pregnancy discrimination suit: "women should stay
home with their children" and a description of a newly hired employee as a
"trophy female" for the department. 190 The court also excluded evidence of a
"lascivious" voicemail message a group of managers inadvertently sent to the
entire company. 191 According to the court, this evidence constituted stray
192
remarks because it did not involve the decisionmaker.
At times, courts even refuse to rely on evidence from supervisors if the
remarks are deemed unrelated to the decisional process. In a race discrimination
case, a worker presented evidence that his supervisor "referred to African
93
The judge
Americans as 'lazy,' 'worthless,' and 'just here to get paid."1

declared, without describing why, that the comments were not causally
connected to the challenged outcome. 194
Courts routinely exclude or diminish plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory
195
conduct or remarks based on who made the remarks.
186

187

Id at

*14
Id (noting that the remarks did not directly relate to stated reasons for termination and

there was no proof that those who fired plaintiff knew about conduct).
188 Id (alteration in original).
189 Id (explaining that the other decisionmakers may not have been aware of the

questioned comments).
190 Suits v. Heil Co., 192 F. App'x 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2006).
191 Id.
192

Id.

193 Chappell v. Bilco Co., No. 3:09-cv-00016, 2011 WL 9037, at *9 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 3,
2011) (granting summary judgment).

Id
195 See, e.g., Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1996)
194

(holding that a comment by a supervisor that he intended to get rid of all the "old timers" was
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact because "the comment was not tied

directly to [the] layoff"); Donadio v. Glob. Experience Specialists, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00317,
2012 WL 5046472, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 17, 2012) ("Stray remarks not acted upon or
communicated to a decision maker are insufficient to establish a dispute of fact about

pretext."); Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(determining a comment to be a stray remark when not uttered by decisionmaker or in context

of decision-making process); Argueta v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., No.

2021 ]
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History of Good Performance

Courts also limit the witnesses and documents plaintiffs can use to show they
performed their job well or possessed the skills required for a job.
Courts frequently refuse to consider positive comments that plaintiffs receive
from current or former supervisors about the plaintiff's work performance. 196
Courts have excluded evidence of a plaintiff's good performance even when that
information is documented in the employer's performance review records1 97 and
when the evidence contains facts about why and how the plaintiff performed
well. 198
Courts have accepted evidence of a plaintiffs poor performance from prior
supervisors when that evidence supported the employer's reasons for the
contested action, but have rejected evidence from other supervisors regarding
the plaintiff's good performance.1 99 In some cases, a judge may even deny an

2:01-cv-04031, 2003 WL 22670915, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (excluding remarks
because speaker was not a decisionmaker); see also Stone, supra note 1, at 160-63 (discussing
cases).

196 See, e.g., Coleman v. Schneider Elec. USA, Inc., 755 F. App'x 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2019)
(indicating positive review by prior supervisor was not probative because new supervisor is

entitled to form a different view); Smith v. Cohen, No. 00-cv-10199, 2001 WL 43521, at *4
(5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2001) (finding magistrate judge did not err in excluding plaintiffs evidence
of positive reviews from former supervisors); Brown v. First Cmty. Bank, No. 7:18-cv-00404,

2019 WL 5445300, at *5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2019) (indicating that reviews from prior
supervisor are not relevant because new supervisor is entitled to form a different opinion and
citing other cases where courts rejected similar evidence); Dinda v. CSC Gov't Sols., LLC,

No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL 4280370, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2019) (discounting old
performance reviews), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-cv-03171, 2019 WL

3244186 (D.S.C. July 19, 2019); Hamilton v. Boys & Girls Club of Metro. Atlanta, Inc., No.
1:12-cv-03609, 2014 WL 4100750, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2014) (asserting that former
supervisor always gave plaintiff positive evaluations was not relevant and citing cases); Miller

v. Univ. of Chi., No. 1:05-cv-01663, 2007 WL 317028, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2007) (noting
that such evidence is "irrelevant"); Ward v. City of North Myrtle Beach, 457 F. Supp. 2d 625,
642 (D.S.C. 2006) (downplaying evidence that one supervisor gave the plaintiff a more
negative evaluation than he deserved). Some judges have recognized that such evidence is

relevant. Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:11-cv-00193, 2012 WL 5467759, at *2 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 9, 2012) (indicating that plaintiff's positive performance as recounted in official

company records is relevant).
197 Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App'x 761, 764-65 (10th Cir. 2007); Carroll
v. Off. Depot, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00414, 2015 WL 1487098, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2015)
(refusing to consider plaintiff's positive work performance over eighteen years).
198 See Dinda, 2019 WL 3244186, at *5 (discounting presence of positive performance
reviews); see also Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument
that differences in performance evaluation establish pretext by emphasizing that "[d]ifferent
supervisors may impose different standards of behavior, and a new supervisor may decide to

enforce policies that a previous supervisor did not consider important").

199 See, e.g., Coleman, 755 F. App'x at 249 (noting that a former manager indicated the
plaintiff had poor communication skills but rejecting evidence that another former supervisor
indicated the plaintiff performed her job well).
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employer's motion for summary judgment but still diminish or exclude a
plaintiff's evidence. 20 0
At times, courts do not even describe the plaintiff's evidence of good
performance. 20' In one case, the appellate court simply noted that the opinions
of the plaintiff's former supervisor and coworkers about the plaintiff's
performance were "close to irrelevant." 202 The trial court in that case did
describe the evidence from the prior supervisor, which indicated the prior
supervisor had no problems with the plaintiff's performance and considered the
plaintiff to be a "star performer." 203 The trial court held that the opinion of the
prior supervisor did not help the plaintiff's case "because acceptable job
performance in the past does not establish acceptable job performance at the
time of the termination." 204
Courts often reject this evidence, even when it is paired with evidence of
differential treatment by a new supervisor. In one case, a plaintiff presented
evidence of excellent performance from a former supervisor of nearly thirty
years. 205 The plaintiff alleged that a new supervisor terminated her because of
her race. 206 The plaintiff relied on the evidence of her performance from her
former supervisor, as well as evidence that the new supervisor treated her
differently than white employees. 207 The plaintiff also presented evidence that
her new supervisor claimed to be enforcing rules that were inconsistent with
prior practice and not communicated to the plaintiff.208
Although the magistrate judge recommended that the employer's summary
judgment motion be denied, the district court judge granted the motion, and the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the employer's
200

McCallum v. Archstone Cmtys., LLC, No. 8:12-cv-01529, 2013 WL 5496837, at *8

(D. Md. Oct. 2, 2013) (noting that statements by apartment residents about leasing manager's

good performance lacked probative value).
201 See, e.g., id. at *8, *14 (noting apartment residents thought plaintiff was doing good
job but not explaining more; court granted employer's motion for summary judgment); Cartee

v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059643, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 6,
2010) (noting that plaintiff had positive reviews under prior supervisor but did not describe
what those reviews stated), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010

WL 5059639 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2010).
202 Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 693 F. App'x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017) ("Davis primarily
relies on the opinions of his former supervisors and coworkers, but such evidence is 'close to
irrelevant."' (quoting Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000))).
203 Davis v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 8:14-cv-03166, 2016 WL 4059346, at *1 (D. Md.
July 27, 2016).
204 Id. at *8.
205 McZeke v. Horry County, No. 4:10-cv-02944, 2013 WL 5438743, at *1 (D.S.C. Aug.
8, 2013) (noting that plaintiff's former supervisor, who oversaw plaintiff's work between
1977 and 2007, called her an "excellent employee").
206

Id.

207 Id. at *11.
208

Id. at *8 ("Judge Harris' testimony as to the expectations he communicated to his staff

is vague at best.").

2021 ]

EVIDENTIARY INEQUALITY

2141

favor.209 The district court decision did not recount the facts upon which the
plaintiff relied, even though it granted summary judgment in the employer's

favor.2 10 The facts supporting the plaintiff's case only emerge from the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The Fourth Circuit opinion also
glossed over the facts supporting the plaintiff's case, 211 except for one dissenting
judge who argued that there were sufficient facts for the case to go to trial.2 12
In another case, a magistrate judge recommended that an employer be granted
summary judgment after recounting the facts "in the light most favorable" to the

plaintiff.213 The magistrate judge described how the plaintiff began working as
a graphic designer at the age of forty-three. 214 Five years later, the plaintiff got

a new supervisor, who was thirty-one. 215 The new supervisor hired three new
team members, all of whom were under the age of thirty. 216 In December of that
year, the plaintiff received negative performance reviews from her new
supervisor, "in spite of her demonstrated artistic performance and generally
positive evaluations under her previous supervisor." 2 17 The new supervisor

noted that the plaintiff "produced 'inconsistent work quality' and took 'longer
to complete tasks than [the] position require[d] in a deadline driven
environment. "'218 The plaintiff complained to company management about the
first evaluation and told them that "as the oldest, I have been called the
'matriarch."' 219 The court did not describe who made the statement but noted
that the plaintiff did not attribute this statement to her supervisor or any member
of management. 220 The following year, the company fired the plaintiff and
replaced her with a younger woman. 221

209
210
2"1

McZeke v. Horry County, 609 F. App'x 140, 141 (4th Cir. 2015).
McZeke, 2013 WL 5434082, at *3.
Id at *8 (describing evidence supporting plaintiff's case, such as lack of clarity in

instructions given to plaintiff and stating reasonable jurors could differ on whether to rule in

favor of defendant); McZeke, 609 F. App'x at 144 (King, J., dissenting) ("[A] reasonable jury
could readily conclude that McZeke was terminated because of her race.").
212 McZeke, 609 F. App'x at 144 (describing plaintiff's argument in only one sentence).
213

Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059643, at *1

(D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL

5059639 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2010).
214 Id
215 Id.
216

Id.

217

218

Id.
Id (alterations in original).

219

Id

220

Id.

221

Id
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The magistrate judge recommended summary judgment for the employer be
222
granted in this case, and the district court judge granted summary judgment.
The court did not draw any inferences from the good performance reviews
submitted by the plaintiff, the change of supervisors, the age of the new
supervisor, the new supervisor hiring young employees to join the work team or

the fact that the employer replaced her with a younger person. This evidence
when taken together created no inference of employment discrimination.
Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff could not even create a prima
facie case under McDonnell Douglas.223 The court reasoned that to establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiff needed to show she was performing her job
satisfactorily based on the opinion of the decisionmaker at the time of her
termination.

224

The court noted that in determining whether the plaintiff is meeting the
expectations of the employer, only the views of the decisionmaker are
relevant. 225 The court rejected the plaintiff's evidence of past good performance;
however, the court then stated that plaintiff's prior supervisors had noted
performance issues. 226 The court also relied on an affidavit of another person on
227
the same work team as the plaintiff who had also noted issues.
Often, courts will use what I am calling the "decisionmaker at the time"
doctrine to exclude plaintiffs' evidence of good performance or qualifications if
228
the evidence is not presented by the "decisionmaker" for the contested action.
Courts also use a named doctrine, the "honest belief' doctrine, to exclude or
diminish plaintiffs' evidence. 229 The McDonnell Douglas framework allows a
plaintiff to prevail by establishing that the employer's articulated reason is
pretextual. When a defendant asserts that the plaintiff engaged in certain
222 Id; Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., No. 3:08-cv-041323, 2010 WL 5059639, at *5
(D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2010) (adopting magistrate judge's recommendation and granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant). The magistrate judge used several of the doctrines discussed

in this Article. The judge reasoned that people calling the plaintiff "matriarch" was a stray
remark and that the plaintiff did not show it was connected to the employment decision.

Cartee, 2010 WL 5059643, at *3. The judge also stated that plaintiff could not establish the
prima facie case from McDonnell Douglas because she could not show she was meeting the
employer's legitimate expectations at the time of her termination. Id. at *3.
223

Cartee, 2010 WL 5059643, at *4.

224 Id ("On the record presented, Cartee cannot establish the third element because she
cannot show that she was meeting Wilbur Smith's legitimate expectations at the time of her
termination.").
225

Id

226

Id at *5 (noting that plaintiff's previous supervisor expressed that plaintiff was tardy

numerous times).
227

Id

(citing plaintiff's coworker who also claimed to notice issues with plaintiff's

productivity and timeliness).
221

Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11 th Cir. 2002). I use the term "decisionmaker"

in quotes because employment outcomes often occur over time and with input from many

people.
229 Gertner, supra note 9, at 121.
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problematic behavior, the plaintiff may try to counteract this assertion with
evidence that she did not engage in the behavior. However, some courts will
reject the plaintiff's evidence because it does not disprove the supervisor's
asserted beliefs about the employee's performance.
The following case provides an example. The defendant stated that it fired the
plaintiff because of "[h]er rudeness and insubordination [which] culminated in
a meeting ... in which she behaved abominably." 230 To counteract the
defendant's evidence, the plaintiff presented the "testimony of other meeting
attendees that she acted professionally and was neither rude nor
condescending." 23 1 The plaintiff also obtained a declaration from the person to
whom she was allegedly rude that stated that he did not recall "anyone ... either
orally or in writing, treating [him] in a rude, condescending, or unprofessional
manner."232

The court rejected the plaintiff's evidence, stating,
[w]hile the testimony of other meeting attendees may show that those
individuals did not find [the plaintiff's] behavior at the ... meeting to be
rude or inappropriate, that evidence is insufficient to show a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether .. . the decisionmaker .. . truly
believed that [the plaintiff's] behavior at the meeting was rude or
inappropriate. 233

While the court rejected the plaintiff's evidence about what occurred at the
meeting under the honest belief doctrine, it allowed the employer to supplement
the supervisor's opinion about what happened with testimony from another
coworker who attended the meeting. 234 When the coworker's testimony

supported the employer, the court credited the testimony, yet similar coworker
evidence supporting the plaintiff was rejected under the honest belief rule.
This even occurs when the testimony comes from supervisory employees.

Courts discount evidence from the employer's own supervisory employees when
that evidence supports the plaintiff. In Bolton v. Sprint/United Management

Co.,235 the court recounted a lengthy history of the plaintiff's performance from
1990 until his termination in 2003.236 The plaintiff presented evidence from a
project leader who expressed surprise that the company terminated the plaintiff
because the project leader had not observed any problems with the plaintiff's
performance that would merit termination.237 The court held that this evidence
230

Main v. Ozark Health, Inc., 959 F.3d 319, 324 (8th Cir. 2020) (first and second

alterations in original).

Id
Id (second alteration in original).
233 Id at 325.
231

232

234

Id

at 322 (allowing the employer to rely on evidence from the employer's head of

information technology).
235 220 F. App'x 761 (10th Cir. 2007).
236 Id at 763-65.
237

Id at 765 n.2.
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was not relevant because the project supervisor was not a decisionmaker in the
decision to terminate the plaintiff.238 While rejecting the plaintiff's evidence, the
court recited performance problems noted by other supervisors, even citing to
239
negative comments in otherwise positive reviews. If only the decisionmaker's
view is important, it is not clear why these negative comments from other
supervisors should play a role in the court's analysis. Yet again, the evidence
counted for the defendant but not for the plaintiff.
IV.

RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY

Evidentiary inequality also happens subtly through a judge's choices on how
to characterize and describe evidence. Courts routinely allow employers to rely
on evidence that is vague or poorly supported. They also allow employers to rely
on evidence without demonstrating why it is relevant to the underlying claim.
Additionally, courts often describe evidence that benefits the employer, even
when it is not clear that the evidence comports with the required procedural
standard. For example, when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a judge

often will recite evidence that favors the employer even when the evidence is
contested or not relevant.
In contrast, courts often refuse to allow workers to rely on similarly vague or
poorly supported evidence. Courts even characterize plaintiffs' evidence as
vague or poorly supported when it is not. Additionally, some judges appear to
apply a heightened relevance standard to the plaintiffs evidence, requiring
plaintiffs to show a closer connection between discriminatory comments and
actions and the contested decision than the relevance standard requires. And, in
many cases, judges do not fully describe the plaintiff's evidence, even when the
procedural posture of the case requires the court to draw all inferences from
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, which is typically the plaintiff in
discrimination cases. 240
Employer's Evidence

A.

Courts regularly rely on vague or generalized characterizations of a plaintiff's
disposition without providing facts to support the generalization. For example,

courts allow evidence about the general perceived conduct or disposition of the
plaintiff, such as evidence that supervisors, coworkers, or others thought the

239

Id. at 769.
Id at 763-65.

241

See, e.g., Berini v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of St. Louis, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035 (E.D. Mo.

238

2006).
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plaintiff was "lazy," 241 "rude," 242 "difficult to work with," 243 or used an "angry
tone." 244 In many of these cases, it is difficult to tell whether the court is only
conveying the generalized information or whether the defendant's evidence
lacks specificity.
Courts often allow a supervisor or other employee to provide documents
conveying the thoughts or opinions of other workers or customers. 245 Thus,
courts allow the employer's witnesses to testify about information they received
secondhand or even thirdhand.
In one case, the employer asserted that it terminated the plaintiff's
employment because the plaintiff "did not do quality work, had a poor work
ethic, and had a negative attitude." 246 The plaintiff argued that the employer did
not present sufficient evidence to support its reason for termination because the
employer presented no evidence that a "customer or coworker complained"
about the plaintiff's performance and the decisionmaker lacked any personal
knowledge about the plaintiff's "performance, attitude, or work ethic." 247
The court held that the employer properly supported its reason for terminating

the plaintiff, even though the employer submitted no "admissible evidence that

241

Baffa v. STAT Health Immediate Med. Care, P.C., No. 2:11-cv-04709, 2013 WL

5234231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (allowing statement from coworker claiming to
have heard negative comments about plaintiff).
242 Thome v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of the Greater Hous. Area, 786
F. App'x 462,
463 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (providing almost no details about complaint, other than

conclusions that plaintiff was rude and disrespectful); Kho v. N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp., 344

F. Supp. 3d 705, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (including statement from coworker that plaintiff was
rude with no context as to how or why belief was held).
243 See, e.g., Shaunpen Zhou v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 2:15-cv-01027, 2017 WL
1217195, at *15 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 31, 2017) (noting affidavit that described complaints from

others that plaintiff was difficult to work with); Bryson v. Renda Broad., Inc., No. 4:07-cv-

00300, 2009 WL 931175, at *8 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2009) (allowing affidavits from corporate
officers of defendant corporation stating that plaintiff was difficult to work with); Kirkish v.
Marketron Int'l, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00062, 2008 WL 11422592, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 15, 2008)
(including statement from coworker that plaintiff was difficult to work with and did not follow
instructions).
244

Jeffrey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00531, 2019 WL 2122989,

at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2019).
241 Moorer v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Sys., 398 F.3d 469, 490 (6th Cir. 2005)
(discussing memorandum from plaintiff's former supervisor about plaintiff's job deficiencies,
including customer complaints and staff communication issues); Bush v. Dictaphone Corp.,

161 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1998) (allowing corporate decisionmakers to file affidavits about
what they had been told about plaintiff from unnamed employees); Vasser v. SaarGummi

Tenn., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00083, 2019 WL 8013869, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing
declaration from plaintiffs manager about coworker complaints). Additionally, in many
cases, courts describe the evidence in a way that makes it nearly impossible to determine how

the employer presented the evidence.
246 Lee v. Safe-Dry Carpet & Upholstery, No. 2:19-cv-00661, 2020 WL 6063746, at *4
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 2020).
247 Id.
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[the plaintiff] actually had a poor work ethic or that any coworker or customer
complained" about his work.248 Instead, the employer supported its reason for
termination by submitting evidence that the person who made the termination
249
decision believed the plaintiff's work quality and work ethic were poor. This
belief was based on a second individual telling the decisionmaker about a
complaint the second individual received about the plaintiff from a third
person.250 The court ruled that the decisionmaker's testimony about what the
second individual told him was non-hearsay and was admissible to show the
251
In other
effect the second individual's statement had on the decisionmaker.
second
a
what
about
testimony
the
decisionmaker's
on
words, the court relied
said.
person
a
third
what
person told him about
The court granted summary judgment for the employer, even though it
admitted that the second individual "was either lying or mistaken when he made
that statement" to the decisionmaker because "neither party ha[d] presented any
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude" that the decisionmaker
did not believe the second individual. 25 2
Courts also rely on evidence that "unnamed" people made certain comments.
One court allowed a supervisor to present an affidavit that stated: "I heard
numerous staff members complain that [the plaintiff] was lazy, not performing
her work and that she continuously made errors ... ."253 In another case, the
Third Circuit indicated that several unidentified former supervisors had noted
the plaintiffs poor performance since 1992.254 The court did not describe the
evidence presented, did not provide the names of the former supervisors, did not
provide the substance of the former supervisors' criticism, or discuss how
plaintiff's past performance issues related to the case before the court.
In another case, a supervisor testified that "sometime in 2013" another person

had told the supervisor that unnamed team members found meetings with the
255
The court credited the
plaintiff to be a "waste of time" and "unproductive."
information, even though the supervisor was not able to report which team

248 Id. at *4-5 (holding that although plaintiff correctly argued that employer did not
present evidence that plaintiff had poor work ethic, employer had met its burden to show

legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff).
249
250

Id.
Id. at *4.

251 Id. at *4 n.4 ("[Safe Dry] can rely on Mr. Hendricks' testimony to show the effect Mr.
Donaldson's statement had on Mr. Hendricks.").
252 Id. at *5 (asserting that the court focuses not on whether reason for terminating plaintiff
was correct but whether reason was honest).
253 Baffa v. STAT Health Immediate Med. Care, P.C., No. 2:11-cv-04709, 2013 WL

5234231, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013) (presenting affidavits from coworkers along with
affidavits from supervisors).
254 Silver v. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts., 212 F. App'x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2006)
("Silver's performance reviews indicate problems with his performance as far back as
1992.").
255 Isbell v. Baxter Healthcare, Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 965, 971, 977 (N.D. 11. 2017).
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members felt this way. 25 6 The supervisor also recounted other general
complaints from unspecified individuals. 257
When granting employers' motions for summary judgment, courts regularly

allow defendants to rely on evidence of a plaintiff's mistakes or poor work
performance from multiple people outside of the decision-making process

without showing how these reports are relevant to the contested action. In one
case, the employer sent the plaintiff a letter indicating that he was terminated for
making a mistake about a patient's medicine. 258 However, in justifying its grant
of summary judgment in favor of the employer, the court recounted the
plaintiff's performance issues for the thirteen years prior to his termination
without describing which of these events were relevant to the contested action. 259
Likewise, employers are allowed to introduce almost any kind of past

misconduct, even if it is not the same conduct that the employer is using to
support its reason for taking a negative action against the plaintiff, or even if the
employer did not rely on the past issues to make the contested decision.
In one case, an employer claimed that it fired an employee because of points
the employee accumulated under a newly created attendance policy. 260 Under
the employer policy, all employees were given a "fresh start" when it enacted

the new attendance policy and past attendance problems were not considered
under the new plan.261 Nonetheless, in granting summary judgment for the
employer, the court noted that the plaintiff had "received several disciplinary
notices based on his attendance record before defendant enacted its new
attendance policy." 262
Indeed, it seems from many of these cases that any poor performance by the
employee at any time supports the employer's decision.263 Courts even allow
256 Id

at 971 (stating that supervisor "was unable to identify" who had made these

statements).
257

Id

258 Jeffrey v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00531, 2019
WL 2122989,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2019).
259 Id at *1 (listing complaints about plaintiff recorded from coworkers and supervisors
between 2002 and 2015).
260 Straka v. Comcast Cable, 897 F. Supp. 2d 346, 352 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (reiterating

defendant's argument that plaintiff's twelve attendance violations warranted dismissal of
plaintiff under the policy).
261

Id

262

Id

263

Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008) (allowing

employer to support its termination decision based, in part, on the fact that plaintiff "once
received a verbal warning for failure to wear safety equipment"); Silver v. Am. Inst. of

Certified Pub. Accts., 212 F. App'x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on performance issues
noted by prior supervisors); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2010) (relying
on evidence that prior supervisor did not recommend plaintiff for promotion even though it
was unclear how this related to contested action); Philpot v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga.,

No.

1:07-cv-00657, 2008 WL 11407269, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2008) (recounting
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defendants to use negative comments contained in otherwise positive reviews of
the plaintiff's performance to support a case.264
Additionally, courts routinely include negative information about a plaintiff
in their recitations of the facts when it is unclear what, if any, relevance the
negative information has to the current case. In one case, the court recounted
how the plaintiff had been promoted in 1995 and cited evidence that the person
who promoted the plaintiff did so "against her better judgment." 265 However,
266
the underlying case related to the plaintiff's termination eight years later. In
another case, a court recited problems with the plaintiff's performance but then
noted "[d]espite these complaints and performance concerns," the supervisor
gave the plaintiff "positive end-of-year performance evaluations" for three years
in a row. 267 If an employer gives a performance review with generally good

comments or promotes an employee, one inference that can be drawn is that the
employee is a good employee. This is the inference most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Yet when granting summary judgment motions, courts often
268
do not draw these positive inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Allowing employers to recite a liturgy of misconduct or poor performance

without connecting it to the contested decision is problematic in its own right.
However, it is especially problematic because of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine, which encourages employers to use the discovery process to find out
about past misconduct. 269 Under this doctrine, an employer can avoid certain
types of relief, such as reinstatement, if it can establish that it would have fired
the employee for past conduct, even if it first found out about the conduct during
discovery.2 7 0 This doctrine incentivizes employers to look for past employee
misconduct, even if the misconduct would otherwise have remained

complaints by coworkers made several years before termination in support of employer's
defense without connecting those complaints to employer's asserted reason for termination,
which related to different issue), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:07-cv-00657,

2008 WL 11407343 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2008).
264 See, e.g., Bolton v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 220 F. App'x 761, 763 (10th Cir. 2007),
aff'g No. 2:04-cv-02156, 2005 WL 4708219 (D. Kan. Dec. 29, 2005) (including manager's
rating of plaintiff's performance as "improvement needed" in generally positive performance

reviews).
265

Bolton, 2005 WL 4708219, at * 1.

266

Id. at *10.
Main v. Ozark Health, Inc., 959 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 2020).
Again, as with all of these doctrines, the case law is not consistent. Some judges will

267
268

infer the causal connection between certain comments and a later action. See del Castillo v.

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00441, 2018 WL 1411155, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
21, 2018) (inferring connection between manager's derogatory remarks about plaintiff's
ethnicity and termination of plaintiff later that month).
269 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (asserting that afteracquired evidence doctrine limits employee's remedies if employer later finds evidence that

would have resulted in termination if known at the time).
270

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995).
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undiscovered without the litigation.27 1 Even if an employer cannot use the newly
discovered evidence to support the after-acquired affirmative defense, the
employer will be tempted to use the newly found information in its recitation of
facts in support of summary judgment. Courts should be careful to require
employers to demonstrate that the relevant decisionmaker knew about the
misconduct at the time of the contested action and that the misconduct played a
role in the outcome.
B.

Worker's Evidence
Courts regularly characterize plaintiffs' evidence as vague, conclusory, or

unreliable, even when the plaintiffs' evidence provides relevant details about her
work performance or the performance of other employees. 272 Courts often will
exclude a plaintiffs testimony when the plaintiff recounts comments made by
other individuals. 273 Some judges also appear to apply a heightened relevance
standard to the plaintiffs evidence, requiring plaintiffs to show a tighter
connection between discriminatory comments and actions and the contested
decision than the relevance standard requires. 274 In addition, it often appears as
if courts are not fully describing the evidence that favors the plaintiff.
When plaintiffs try to present evidence of their good performance from prior
supervisors or coworkers, courts often label such evidence as merely an

271 Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1070 (stating that employer can avoid certain remedies by finding
after-acquired evidence of misconduct).
272

See, e.g., Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[The plaintiff]

argues that she performed well in her job and offers ...

e-mails and memoranda written by

[the plaintiff] herself and statements allegedly made by her co-workers. In doing so, [the
plaintiff] can prove only the unremarkable fact that [the parties] disagreed about the quality

of [the plaintiff's] work.").
273 See, e.g., Bart-Williams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1:16-cv-01338, 2017 WL 4401463,

at *10 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2017) (stating that plaintiff's recounting of positive feedback from
others is irrelevant).
274

See, e.g., Gamble v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 132 F. App'x 263, 266 (11th Cir. 2005)

(asserting that evidence offered by plaintiff, including opinions from coworkers, did not meet

burden of showing pretext).
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opinion275 or as "irrelevant." 276 At times, courts characterize the evidence
presented by the plaintiff's coworkers as merely expressing their opinion about
the plaintiff's work performance, even when the evidence presented does more
277
than express a general opinion.

Contrasting how judges view similar evidence in the same case further
highlights the evidentiary inequality. For example, in Stevens v. Del Webb
Communities, Inc.278 the plaintiff tried to offer evidence from coworkers that
279
The court held that these
"she was pleasant" and was a "team player."
280
However, in
coworkers' opinions were not relevant to the plaintiff's claim.
problems
performance
had
plaintiff
that
stated
court
the
the very next paragraph,

28
and that these were evidenced by complaints from the plaintiff's coworkers. 1
The coworker evidence that favored the plaintiff were irrelevant opinions, but
the court treated the coworker evidence that favored the employer as uncontested
facts.

275

Id. (finding that coworker's positive statement of plaintiff's performance did not

demonstrate that employer's reasons for not promoting plaintiff were pretextual); Hawkins,

203 F.3d at 280 (stating that evidence of coworkers' statements of plaintiff's work only prove
that plaintiff and manager disagree about plaintiff's quality of work); Brenner v. City of N.Y.
Dep't of Educ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 407, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (indicating that plaintiff's claims
that he was set up to fail "amounts to nothing more than conclusion"); McKinley v. Skyline

Chili, Inc., No.

1:11-cv-00344, 2012 WL 3527222, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2012) (holding

that plaintiff's reliance on opinions from coworkers about her performance does not show that
employer's reason is pretext); Frazier v. Doosan Infracore Int'l, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00187, 2011

WL 13161996, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2011) (stating that opinions from coworkers who
were not involved in decisions about plaintiff are "not relevant to the pretext inquiry"), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 1:09-cv-00187, 2011 WL 13162052 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 24,
2011); Stevens v. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 698, 708-09 (D.S.C. 2006) (stating
that coworkers' opinions about whether plaintiff was a team player were not sufficient to

create issue of material fact).
276 Bart-Williams, 2017 WL 4401463, at *10 ("[T]o the extent that Plaintiff claims she
received positive feedback from . . . others . . . such feedback is irrelevant."); see also Davis
v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 693 F. App'x 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting evidence was "close to
irrelevant").

Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating
that coworkers' affidavits and depositions indicating plaintiff's performance was satisfactory
277

do "not create a material issue of fact"); see also Frazier,2011 WL 13161996, at * 13 (finding
plaintiff's use of coworkers' opinions irrelevant for pretext argument); Cornelius v. City of

Columbia, No. 3:08-cv-02508, 2010 WL 1258009, at *3 n.9 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2010) (noting
that evaluations from coworkers and former supervisors were not relevant); Alderman v.

Inmar Enters., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 532, 542 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (finding affidavits from
coworkers as stating opinions and irrelevant).
278
279
280
281

Stevens, 456 F. Supp. 2d 698.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 729-30.
Id. at 730 (finding that plaintiff's job performance was "unsatisfactory, and was

unmatched by any other employee" based on statements from coworkers and customers

submitted by defendant).
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Courts similarly limit plaintiffs' abilities to support their cases by testifying
about their own good conduct or to deny they engaged in the conduct alleged by
the employer. Courts often note that a plaintiff may not contest the defendant's
reason for an action by stating the plaintiff's own "opinion" about work
performance. 282 While this may be true in some circumstances, judges
characterize a plaintiff's evidence as merely the plaintiff's opinion, even when
the plaintiff is testifying that she did not engage in the misconduct that the
employer is using to justify the contested action.283 Therefore, in some instances,

judges improperly characterize facts as opinion.
It is difficult to evaluate claims that a plaintiff is offering an opinion because
judges often do not describe the plaintiff's affidavit or testimony in detail. 284 The
details matter in determining whether the judge is properly discounting the
evidence. For example, if the plaintiff testifies that she was a "good" employee
without more, this evidence likely is not relevant for purposes of summary

judgment. However, if the plaintiff testifies that she did not engage in
misconduct alleged by the employer, this is not merely an opinion because the
plaintiff is contesting a fact asserted by the employer with her own factual
evidence.
Courts also label the plaintiff's evidence of employer misconduct as vague or
conclusory. 285 Often, courts characterize a plaintiff's evidence as vague even
when it is not. In one case, a worker alleged that he was demoted based on his
race. 286 The plaintiff alleged that because he was Black, he was given less
support and held to a different performance standard than White employees in
the same role. 287 In support of his claim, he offered an affidavit from a coworker
stating that the person who demoted the plaintiff had called the coworker a
"n*****" at work.288 Despite this evidence, the court granted summary

282 See, e.g., Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte Maritimo y las Islas
Municipio,

No. 3:16-cv-02513, 2019 WL 441996, at *4 (D.P.R. Jan. 25, 2019) (citing cases for
proposition that "[i]t is well-established that a party's subjective opinion as to her
qualifications is insufficient" to establish plaintiff is qualified), appealdismissed, No. 19-cv01276, 2020 WL 7379898 (1st Cir. July 30, 2020); McNamee v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 914
F. Supp. 2d 408, 418 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing cases).
283 See, e.g., Beard v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 2:88-cv-01248, 1990 WL 299806,
at
*4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 1990) (discounting plaintiff's affidavit that she did not engage in some

of the claimed problematic behavior).
284 See, e.g., id. (claiming plaintiff used broad terms in her affidavit to deny employer's

claims without describing what terms plaintiff used).
285 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Dale Med. Ctr., No. 1:05-cv-00540, 2006 WL 1537228,
at *9 n.9
(M.D. Ala. May 31, 2006) (indicating that affidavit stating individual was angry while
terminating the plaintiff was conclusory and needed additional detail).
286 Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 301 (6th Cir. 2016).
287 Id at 300-01 ("Tennial further asserts that previous and subsequent Caucasian Hub
Managers of the Twilight Sort also failed to meet performance goals, yet were not demoted
like he was.").
288 Id. at 302.
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judgment in favor of the employer. 289 The court diminished the coworker
affidavit by calling it "barebones" and saying it consisted of one sentence
"claiming that [the supervisor] called the co-worker a 'n*****' while both were
at work." 290 However, given what the affidavit was trying to convey, it is unclear
what else the affidavit needed to contain to be relevant. The court then stated
that no inference of discrimination could be drawn in the plaintiff's case from
the coworker evidence. 291
Courts have also refused to rely on a plaintiff's evidence when they deem the
evidence to be "self-serving." 292 Courts seldom raise that critique with respect
to the defendant's evidence. Judge James Ho has criticized such limits on
evidence, noting that the appropriate question is not whether evidence is self293
serving but whether the evidence contains sufficient facts.
Courts frequently prohibit plaintiffs from presenting evidence about what
other people told them. 294 In one age discrimination and retaliation case, a
plaintiff tried to present an affidavit that a coworker told her a supervisor wanted
295
to get rid of the plaintiff because "you can't teach an old dog new tricks." The
court stated that because the plaintiff had not submitted any testimony from the
296
coworker, she could not rely on this evidence.
In another case, a plaintiff alleged that his employer terminated him based on
his age. 297 He presented evidence that people in his department, including a prior
289 Id at 305.
290
291
292

Id at 302.
Id
Salazar v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 982 F.3d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing cases).

293 Id at 392 (Ho, J., concurring) (writing separately to clarify that summary judgment was
appropriate because plaintiff's testimony was conclusory, not because it was self-serving).
294 See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat'l Vision Inc., 568 F. App'x 854, 858 (11th Cir. 2014)
(deciding that statements made to plaintiff by another individual that other people said they
wanted to hire a White person for position were inadmissible hearsay); Adefila v. Select
Specialty Hosp., 28 F. Supp. 3d 517, 524 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (rejecting as hearsay plaintiff's

testimony that manager told her that third party had told manager that plaintiff filed EEOC
charge of discrimination against her former employer); Duncan v. Thorek Mem'l Hosp., 784

F. Supp. 2d 910, 921 (N.D. 111. 2011) (prohibiting a plaintiff from testifying that other workers
told her that company representative said she was cutting back the plaintiff's hours because

of her age); Harrison v. Formosa Plastics Corp. Tex., 776 F. Supp. 2d 433, 441 (S.D. Tex.
2011) (holding that in an age discrimination case, plaintiff could not testify that another
employee told her that her replacement was younger employee); see also Ward v. Jackson

State Univ., 602 F. App'x 1000, 1003 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting plaintiffs evidence as hearsay
because it was not related to plaintiffs work duties).
295 Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059643, at *3 n.3
(D.S.C. Oct. 6, 2010) ("Although Cartee relies heavily on hearsay statements from a co-

worker, Cara Johnson, regarding Powell's intent to force Cartee out and his alleged comment
that 'you can't teach an old dog new tricks,' Cartee has not presented any testimony from

Johnson-or any other evidence-that complies with the requirements of Rule 56."), report
and recommendationadopted, No. 3:08-cv-04132, 2010 WL 5059639 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2010).
296 Id
297 Straka v. Comcast Cable, 897 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
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He also testified that

people would regularly ask him when he was going to retire. 299 His case also

relied on a number of arguments related to how the employer administered its
attendance policy. 300 One of the plaintiff's allegations was that the employer
often excused absences for younger employees while refusing to excuse
absences for older employees. 301 In support of this, the plaintiff offered his
testimony that two young employees had told the plaintiff that they were
regularly given the opportunity to explain their absences before they were
recorded as absences. 302 The plaintiff alleged that he was not given similar
opportunities. 303 The court rejected the plaintiff's evidence recounting
statements from his coworkers as hearsay. 304 Strangely, it also rejected the

evidence because the plaintiff "did not develop any evidence from defendant's
principals that would provide independent evidence of the events relayed in
these individuals' statements." 30s
Courts often reject a plaintiff's evidence even when the evidence is relevant
to the contested decision. In an age discrimination case, the plaintiff presented
evidence that his supervisor stated the following: "you know, the job is
changing," "a person from your era wouldn't have the type of analytical skills
that we require," "things are different today," and "the skills needed today are
typically of a younger sales manager." 306 The trial court granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff could not make a

causal connection between these comments in August and his termination in
December. 307

298
299

Id. at 360.

301

Id. at 353.

Id.
300 Id. at 352-53.
302 Id. ("For example, two younger employees ... told plaintiff that their supervisors
would inform them when an event was about to be placed on their records and they were able
to discuss the matter with their supervisors to provide an explanation or their version of what

had happened.").
303 Id
304 Id at 360 ("Plaintiff's account of [younger employees] receiving more favorable
treatment is derived solely from those two individual's statements made to plaintiff on the

job.... [Plaintiff has not] listed these two as witnesses on his pretrial statement.... As such,
the statements are classic hearsay which must be excluded .... " (citation omitted)).

305

Id

306 Testa v. CareFusion, 305 F. Supp. 3d 423, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (rejecting comments
as irrelevant stray remarks made too long before the adverse action to demonstrate

discriminatory intent). The supervisor denied making those comments. Id.
307 Id
at 435 (disregarding remarks as being too distant in time from the adverse action);
see also Harrison v. Formosa Plastics Corp. Tex., 776 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
(rejecting evidence of frequent comments by coworkers describing plaintiff as "old man,"

"old fart," "old son of a bitch," and "fat old bastard" made right before his termination
concluding they were not connected to his termination).
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As previously discussed, this is a classic example of the stray remarks
doctrine. Although it is not often described in this way, this doctrine serves as a
special, overly restrictive relevance standard for discrimination cases. To be
relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence must relate to a fact of
consequence in the underlying action and the evidence must tend to make that
fact more or less probable. 308 The relevance standard applies to all parties in
litigation, but courts often apply the stray remarks doctrine to limit only the
plaintiff's evidence.
The following case demonstrates how the stray remarks doctrine is more
restrictive than a traditional relevance standard (and in some cases appears to
ignore the relevance standard completely). In one sex discrimination case, a

plaintiff alleged (among other things) that her employer gave her a lower bonus
and later fired her because of her sex. 309 A judge held that it was irrelevant that
a supervisor whose input was considered in both decisions repeatedly referred
3 10
According to
to the plaintiff as "bitch," "cunt," "whore," "slut," and "tart."
in
connection
made
not
were
they
because
the judge, these were stray remarks
311
these
exclude
credibly
could
court
a
how
is
unclear
It
with an adverse action.
standard.
relevance
statements using the typical
There are numerous cases in which courts refuse to consider as probative
evidence potentially discriminatory statements by supervisors or others because
the court believes the plaintiff has not sufficiently tied the remarks to the
312
contested employment decisions.
308 FED. R. EvID. 401.
309 Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 1:02-cv-05191, 2003 WL 22251313, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2003) (alleging in complaint that lower bonus and relocation decision were intended
to lead to termination when plaintiff inevitably declined).
310 Id at *10.
311 Id ("However, these 'stray remarks in the workplace' are not alleged to have been
made as part of any adverse discriminatory employment action taken against [the plaintiff] by

[the supervisor].").
312 See, e.g., Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App'x 831, 835-38, 843-46 (3d Cir.
2016) (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer where evidence presented that
supervisor repeatedly referred to women's appearance and referred to them as Barbie dolls,
along with other evidence of unequal treatment); White v. Andy Frain Servs., Inc., 629 F.

App'x 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2015) (ignoring remarks about plaintiff's race and religion because
plaintiff did not establish causal connection between remarks and adverse action); Shorter v.

ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that supervisor referring
to plaintiff as an "incompetent n*****," stating she was on the defensive because she was
Black, and that she talked like people of her culture were not comments that were sufficiently

connected to termination decision); Smith v. Mayo Clinic, 158 F. Supp. 3d 764, 767 (D. Minn.
2016) (finding evidence that supervisors occasionally used "racially charged" language was
insufficiently connected to one of those supervisors disciplining the plaintiff for missing work,
including for being one minute late); Hiramoto v. Goddard Coll. Corp., 184 F. Supp. 3d 84,
106 (D. Vt. 2016) (concluding that contested evidence that program director stated that
plaintiff "may not be able to do this job because of [her] culture" and "[she] may be happier
working somewhere else" were not evidence of discrimination because they were not
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One especially problematic feature of the stray remarks doctrine is that it is a
one-sided doctrine. Courts often exclude plaintiff's evidence as lacking context
when the plaintiff does not directly tie the discriminatory comment to the
contested action or when the comments were made by people who are not
decisionmakers. However, courts regularly allow defendants to support the
contested actions with evidence of performance problems across wide ranges of
time and from multiple people, without tying that history to the contested
decision.
Importantly, when reading cases in which courts grant summary judgment to

the employer, it often seems like the court is not fully describing the evidence
offered by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs' evidence is often dismissed or diminished
without the court even describing what it contains. For example, a court might

provide detail about negative comments in a performance review, without also
describing the positive comments in an overall positive review. 3 13 Or, a court
will label a coworker's views of a plaintiffs performance as "opinion" without
fully describing what the coworker said.
V.

EXPLAINING AND REMEDYING EVIDENTIARY INEQUALITY

Remedying

evidentiary

inequality

requires

courts

to

recognize

and

acknowledge the scope of the problem. Despite the pervasiveness of the
inequality, the path forward is not complicated. Courts must declutter
discrimination law by abolishing certain doctrines and reorienting summary
judgment motion practice around core principles found within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A.

ExplainingEvidentiaryInequality

Evidentiary inequality occurs in many ways. Employment discrimination law
is replete with named doctrines that favor the employer and disfavor the worker.

At the same time, a number of unnamed, and therefore invisible, doctrines also
bias the evidentiary record. The cumulative weight of the named and unnamed
doctrines makes it difficult for plaintiffs to present evidence to courts.
As discussed throughout this Article, multiple named doctrines contribute to

this evidentiary inequality. Some of these doctrines are perversions of the
McDonnell Douglas test. These include overly rigid descriptions of the prima
meaningfully involved in termination decision; director denied making comments (alterations
in original)); Wilkie v. Geisinger Sys. Servs., No. 3:12-cv-00580, 2014 WL 4672489, at *8
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2014) (finding evidence that supervisors who recommended and approved
plaintiff's termination made comments that they were not fond of Germans and made Hitler
jokes was not sufficient absent other evidence to overcome stray remarks doctrine; court

allowed the case to proceed because of additional evidence).
313 McDowell v. Nucor Bldg. Sys., No. 3:10-cv-00172, 2011 WL 7447349, at *4 (D.S.C.
Dec. 15, 2011) (dismissing claim because plaintiff's evidence, including recent positive
performance review, could not establish that he was meeting employer expectations based on
employer evidence of work-quality issues), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-

cv-00172, 2012 WL 714632 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012).
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facie case that require the plaintiff to establish that the employer believed the
plaintiff was meeting its expectations at the time of the contested decision and
overly formalistic ideas of pretext that focus on the intent of the decisionmaker
and the "honest belief' of the decisionmaker. The stray remarks doctrine also
favors the employer.
There are also several unnamed and thus somewhat invisible mechanisms that
contribute to evidentiary inequality. First, courts do not apply the named
doctrines in the same way to the plaintiff's and the defendant's evidence. As
discussed throughout this Article, courts often use unnamed doctrines that focus
on the decisionmaker at the time of the contested action to limit the plaintiff's
evidence. However, courts regularly allow defendants to present evidence to
support their actions by people who were not decisionmakers at the time of the
contested action and evidence that does not reflect the plaintiff's performance at
the time of the contested action. Courts often do not require the employer to
show what information the decisionmaker knew about and relied on when
making a contested decision.
Evidentiary inequality also occurs when judges do not apply the same

inferences to different kinds of evidence. Judges routinely use the stray remarks
doctrine to exclude or diminish a discriminatory remark because it was made
one year prior to a contested decision. The underlying inference is that the
comment is not relevant because it is too distant. However, there is no stray
mistake doctrine to limit negative information about the plaintiff. All of the
plaintiff's missteps are somehow relevant to the underlying claim, but few
instances of the employer's agent's problematic conduct and statements are
relevant.
Finally, courts apply ideas like relevance and reliability differently depending
on which party provides the evidence. They label the plaintiffs' evidence as
vague or an opinion, while allowing defendants to rely on similar evidence. They
fail to describe evidence that favors the plaintiff. They describe evidence
presented by the defendant that is either contested or irrelevant and draw
inferences in favor of the defendant either explicitly or implicitly.
The cumulative weight of both the named doctrines and the unnamed
mechanisms makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases. This imbalance
is made even more problematic because it often occurs when judges are granting
employers' motions for summary judgment.
The Path Forward

B.

Evidentiary inequality can be contested on both substantive and procedural
grounds. Substantively, many of the doctrines and practices described in this
Article do not comport with the text or purposes of the federal discrimination
statutes. Additionally, the evidentiary inequality ignores several Supreme Court
3 14
While the substantive
cases that reject limits on the plaintiff's evidence.
314

See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-58 (2006) (noting courts' failures to
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critiques are important and backed by a deep and well-established literature,
federal district and appellate courts have largely ignored them, at least with
respect to the named doctrines.' 15
Another path may prove more fruitful. Instead of attacking the doctrines
purely on substantive grounds, it may be more compelling to attack them from
both a procedural and a substantive perspective. One of the most surprising
aspects of the doctrines and practices that underlie evidentiary inequality is that
apply appropriate standards for plaintiffs' evidence); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140, 150-52 (2000) (rejecting lower court's refusal to fully credit all of
plaintiff's evidence related to age discrimination).
315 There is a significant criticism of the frameworks courts use to undermine the reach of
discrimination law. See, e.g., Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment
DiscriminationCases: A Judge'sPerspective, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 671, 674-75, 678-79

(2013) (rejecting declining discrimination or judicial hostility towards plaintiffs as primary
causes of high summary judgment rates; suggesting a more simplified approach to evaluating
the evidence and cautioning judges against engaging in fact-finding); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discriminationby Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728,734 (2011) (citing scholarship diagnosing
the high failure rates at summary judgment; identifying judicial focus on comparators as a
significant cause); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (advising judges to
lift "the lens of workplace essentialism"). See generally SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A.

(2017)
(exploring the ways in which courts have developed frameworks and doctrines that disfavor
THOMAS, UNEQUAL: How AMERICA'S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW

&

employees in discrimination suits). The literature discusses how stereotyping, intersectional
discrimination, and unconscious bias might impact outcomes. See Devon W. Carbado
Cheryl I. Harris, Intersectionality at 30: Mapping the Margins of Anti-Essentialism,
Intersectionality, andDominance Theory, 132 HARV. L. REv. 2193, 2202 (2019) (describing,
among other issues, how Black women have been "deemed unable to represent women in sex
discrimination claims or to represent Blacks in race discrimination claims"); Stephanie
Bornstein, Unifying AntidiscriminationLaw Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK

L. REv. 919, 925 (2016) (arguing that novel and intersectional discrimination cases can
expand the bounds of substantive discrimination law and create more equal workplaces);
Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity andDiscrimination:A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L.

REv. 1439, 1459 (2009) (discussing the even higher summary judgment rate dismissing
actions bringing multiple discrimination claims); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with
Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 762, 771-72 (1997) (criticizing court doctrines
defining the link between sexual harassment and sex discrimination and arguing for a stronger
connection); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersectionof Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,

1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 158 (criticizing treatment of sex and race as mutually exclusive
categories); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-21 (1987) (questioning the requirement for

discriminatory purpose in discrimination suits). The frameworks judges use may rely too
much on fitting the plaintiff within a narrowly defined protected class, rather than focusing
on whether discrimination occurred. See Jessica A. Clarke, ProtectedClass Gatekeeping, 92

N.Y.U. L. REv. 101, 104 (2017) (criticizing dismissal of actions in which plaintiffs were
subjected to the "wrong" kind of discrimination, including as applied to intersectional
discrimination); see also Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REv. 1307, 1365 (2012) (criticizing formalistic approaches to
discrimination law).
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they clearly violate requirements found within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fortunately, that means that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence provide
concrete ways for judges to eliminate evidentiary inequality without requiring
3 16
them to grapple with complex, substantive discrimination issues.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 explicitly cabins judges' ability to grant
summary judgment. Specifically, Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment is

only appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
317
The
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Rule also notes that "court[s] should state on the record the reasons for granting
or denying the motion." 3 18 When considering a motion for summary judgment,

a federal court is required to "view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party." 3 19
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevance broadly. Evidence is relevant
if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence" and the "fact is of consequence in determining the
action." 320 Taken together, the core principles derived from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 and Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provide the backbone for the
rules that govern litigation. These rules are not specific to any particular
substantive area. They are supposed to be applied in the same way to all litigants,
whether the litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant.
Let's examine how two key ideas-the stray remarks doctrine and the
"decisionmaker at the time" doctrine-fail on both substantive and procedural
grounds.
The stray remarks doctrine should be easy to eliminate. The doctrine is not
required by or contained within the text of any of the main federal discrimination
statutes. Substantive critiques of the doctrine are long-established and made by
321
both scholars and judges.

316 I am not suggesting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of
Evidence are perfect. See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L.

REv. 867, 870, 872 (2018) (rejecting the notion of the Federal Rules of Evidence as "allseeing, vigilant gatekeepers"); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CriticalRace Theory of

Evidence, 101 MiNN'1. L. REv. 2243, 2244 (2017) (discussing how judges following the Federal
Rules of Evidence too often admit testimony about the lived experience of White people
without evidentiary scrutiny, while excluding evidence related to the lived experiences or
racialized reality of People of Color). See generally Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and
the TorturedTrilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII andADEA Cases,

34 B.C. L. REv. 203 (1993) (criticizing several 1989 Supreme Court decisions as severely
limiting employment discrimination claims).
317 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
318

Id

Crawford v. Metro. Gov't ofNashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 274 n. 1(2009)
(quoting Broseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 195 n.2 (2004) (per curiam)).
320 FED. R. Evm. 401.
321 See supra notes 45-47.
319
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And, the Supreme Court has cautioned courts against disregarding or
diminishing the plaintiffs' evidence in multiple cases. For example, in Reeves v.
SandersonPlumbingProducts, Inc.,322 the Supreme Court held that the appellate

court erred in overturning a jury verdict because the plaintiff had presented both
evidence of pretext and additional evidence of age-based comments. 323 The
Court noted that the appellate court had not drawn all inferences in favor of the
plaintiff and had disregarded "critical" evidence that favored the plaintiff. 324 In

Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,325 the Court reminded the appellate court that it was
not appropriate for it to draw conclusions about whether the term "boy" was
used in racially discriminatory way because a speaker's meaning depends on
"context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage." 326
The procedural critique is also compelling. The stray remarks doctrine is a

special evidentiary rule that courts created and apply in discrimination cases.
The doctrine contradicts the normal standards of relevance found within the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 327 The stray remarks doctrine would not be
remarkable if it simply rejected irrelevant evidence. Instead, as shown
throughout this Article, judges often use the doctrine to exclude or diminish
evidence that a reasonable jury might use to find in favor of the plaintiff. 328
However, ifjudges were required to describe why a discriminatory remark is not
relevant, using the standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence, they

would have a difficult time explaining why such evidence does not meet the
standard.
Additionally, to the extent the stray remarks doctrine excludes or diminishes
evidence that would otherwise be relevant, it also violates Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 when a judge uses the doctrine to exclude the plaintiff's evidence
at the summary judgment stage. 329 The stray remarks doctrine works to favor the

employer and disfavor the plaintiff. In this way, it directly contradicts the
summary judgment standard that requires courts to view all inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. If a reasonable jury could use the evidence to find in
favor of the plaintiff, the judge must make that favorable inference for purposes
of summary judgment.

Similarly, there are strong procedural and substantive reasons for eliminating
doctrines that focus on "the decisionmaker at the time." As discussed earlier,
these doctrines are often centered in the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
330
and the pretext prong.

322

530 U.S. 133 (2000).

323 Id. at 140, 150-54.
324 Id. at 152.
325 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
326 Id. at 456.
327 FED. R. Evo. 401, 403.
328

See discussion supra Sections IB,

329 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
330

See discussion supra Section J.B.

I.C, ILB.1, III.B.1 & IV.B.
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Substantively, it is a perversion of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
to require not only that a plaintiff establish she met the employer's subjective
standards but also that she does so only by using evidence that directly relates to
the decisionmaker's opinion. This way of articulating the prima facie case
directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent stating that the prima facie case is
to
not onerous.33 1 One appellate court has noted that "a plaintiff's burden 332
minimis."'
de
and
'minimal
design,
by
is,
case
facie
prima
establish an initial
If a plaintiff is required to establish that she met the subjective requirements of
the job in the view of the decisionmaker, the prima facie case becomes onerous
for the plaintiff. Substantively, it is difficult to understand how such a
requirement even makes sense as part of the prima facie case.
Correctly understood, the second factor of the prima facie case only requires
the plaintiff to show that "the plaintiff was qualified for the position in
question." 333 The plaintiff can satisfy the second factor "by showing that she
performed at a level that generally met her employer's objective minimum
qualifications." 334 For example, a plaintiff would fail the second factor if she
applied to be a truck driver but did not possess the required license for the job,
an objective qualification. Consideration of whether the plaintiff subjectively
performed her job well belongs in the second and third prongs of McDonnell
Douglas.

Similarly, McDonnell Douglasdoes not require a plaintiff to establish pretext
by showing the beliefs of the decisionmaker at the time of the contested action.
A plaintiff can establish the final prong of McDonnell Douglas "either directly
by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
335
In Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,336 the
unworthy of credence."
Supreme Court held that if the reason articulated by the employer "does not seem
to make sense, a factfinder may infer that the employer's asserted reason for its
337
A plaintiff may establish
action is a pretext for unlawful discrimination."
pretext "by demonstrating 'such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
"I Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015); Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
332 Kelleher v. Fred A. Cook, Inc., 939 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Woodman
v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also Howard v. Port Auth. of N.Y.
& N.J., 771 F. App'x 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing prima facie case burden as "de
minimis"); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (describing burden of
establishing prima facie case as minimal); Eyer, supra note 9, at 1006-08 (arguing that
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a technical version of the test in favor of a more fluid
version).

Willis v. UPMC Child.'s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 644 (3d Cir. 2015).
334 Loyd v. Saint Joseph Mercy Oakland, 766 F.3d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 2014).
333

335 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
336 575 U.S. 206 (2015).
337 Id. at 233 (holding that employer's actual reason for taking action, not its asserted
justification, is determinative).
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incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons
for its action that a reasonable factfmder could find them unworthy of
credence.'"'338
A plaintiff may establish pretext when the reason asserted by the employer
"does not pass the straight-face test." 339 In one case the employer asserted that
it fired a worker for "[e]ating a handful of Doritos from an open bag on a
countertop in the lunchroom." 340 The court held that a jury could infer pretext,
especially because the employer's reason "strikes us as swatting a fly with a
'

sledge hammer." 34
The plaintiff can show the employer created post hoc rationalizations for the

outcome after it occurred or for litigation purposes. 342 The plaintiff might present
evidence that the employer provided multiple, inconsistent, or contradictory
reasons for the outcome. 343 Pretext can be established when the employer
overreacted to the plaintiff's conduct to justify a negative outcome. 344 The
"sudden emergence" of new performance problems under a new supervisor can
be evidence of pretext. 345 The plaintiff might show that the employer shifted the

338 Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1274 (11th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)); see Potter v.
Synerlink Corp., 562 F. App'x 665, 678 (10th Cir. 2014) (overstating number of times
plaintiff was counseled was evidence of pretext); Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 F.3d 1258, 1268
(10th Cir. 2019) ("Plaintiff must show that the proffered reasons 'were so incoherent, weak,

inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude the reasons were
unworthy of belief."' (quoting Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006))).
For a complete discussion of the third step of McDonnell Douglas, see SANDRA SPERINO,
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 7 (Sandra

Sperino ed., 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/28538757672.
339 Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1999).
340 Id.
341

Id.
Kocienski v. NRT Techs., Inc., 787 F. App'x 411, 412 (9th Cir. 2019) ("[D]oubt is cast
on an employer's proffered reasons for why an employee was laid off where a straightforward
342

answer was not given when he or she was terminated, but later is provided during litigation.");

Gomez v. Haystax Tech., Inc., 761 F. App'x 220, 235 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a
plaintiff may demonstrate pretext where asserted justifications are invented after the fact).
343

See, e.g., Fassbender v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 887 (10th Cir. 2018)

(finding that employer's inconsistent assertions about which incidents prompted termination
of employee are evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer pretext); see also Haynes

v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that evidence
employer changed reason for termination from job abandonment to plaintiff's bad attitude
was sufficient to establish pretext).

344 Rowlands v. United Parcel Serv., 901 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that
employer's overreaction to statement by employee about carrying taser can serve as evidence

from which jury can reasonably find pretext).
341 Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 277 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that
trier of fact could reasonably view as suspicious employer's sudden assertion of managerial
problems on part of employee given no mention of such in employee's prior work history).
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346
criteria for a job to favor people in a different protected class than the plaintiff.
Courts that apply decisionmaker at the time doctrines do not properly understand

pretext from a substantive perspective.

The decisionmaker at the time doctrines also fail on procedural grounds. Like
the stray remarks doctrine, the decisionmaker at the time doctrines also create a
special relevance rule for employment discrimination cases that is different than
Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Additionally, these doctrines contradict Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 because they prioritize the defendant's version of
347
events over other evidence the plaintiff might have to establish discrimination.
Additionally, judges often do not apply the "decisionmaker at the time"
doctrines to the employer's evidence. Judges regularly allow employers to
provide evidence of employee mistakes or poor performance across a wide
swath of time and even when the employer has also praised or promoted the
348
Judges allow employers to rely on evidence
employee during the time period.

from a wide range of people, including customers, coworkers, and former
managers. 349 Judges typically do not require the employer to even show the
decisionmaker knew about past poor performance problems at the time of the
decision.
This procedural problem-that courts do not apply the same rules to the
plaintiff's and the defendant's evidence-may be a way to show courts a
fundamental issue with how they view discrimination. When it comes to the
employer, judges do not see the contested action as one decision that is made at
a certain period of time. Instead, judges see the decision as accumulating over
time through the input of many people. This realization can be beneficial for
changing how judges frame discrimination.
One of the more problematic aspects of discrimination jurisprudence is the
fiction that a decision is made by one person or a small group of people at a
particular point in time. While this may happen in some cases, in many instances

the decision is part of a longer process. A rich, scholarly literature explicitly or
implicitly criticizes overreliance on models that frame discrimination as
individual animus that manifests at specific moments when decisions are made.
This literature highlights how decisions happen over time and are affected by
organizational structures and choices.35 0 The literature discusses how
346

Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs., 953 F.3d 923, 932 (7th Cir. 2020) (shifting job criteria

to favor male applicants could be evidence of pretext).

347 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
348

See supra Section H.A.

349 See supra Section III.A.
350 Catherine Albiston & Tristin K. Green, Social Closure Discrimination,39 BERKELEY

J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 2 (2018) (exploring the ways in which organizational systems such as
word-of-mouth hiring, cronyism, and nepotism contribute to discriminatory employment
practices); Tristin K. Green, A StructuralApproach as AntidiscriminationMandate:Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REv. 849, 850 (2007) (reasoning that change at organizational

level of employment operations is necessary to minimize discriminatory decision-making
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stereotyping,3 5' intersectional discrimination, 352 and unconscious bias might
impact outcomes. 35 3
The evidentiary inequality reveals that judges are willing to view employment

outcomes as part of a long chain of events affected by numerous people-at least
with respect to the employer's evidence. While it may be true to say that a
supervisor decides to fire someone, that decision is often only one part of a
longer process through which supervisors form opinions and make judgments
based on their own conscious and unconscious expectations of people, the
feelings and opinions of others, and societal and work-specific expectations.
Judges seem to understand this when it comes to viewing how a supervisor forms
a negative impression of an employee because judges often allow this evidence
to support the employer's narrative. 354

Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to show that discrimination
happens in similar ways. Pointing out the procedural problems with the
evidentiary inequality may lead judges to recognize the larger substantive issues

regarding how they view discrimination.
C.

ProceduralGuardrails

Courts could eliminate evidentiary inequality by eliminating the doctrines and
ideas that create it. This could be done by the Supreme Court, appellate courts,
or even by individual district court judges when consistent with stare decisis.

given that the greatest problems of discrimination appear to be structural and organizational);
Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REv. 623, 625 (2005)
(framing work culture as means of structural discrimination); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1262 (2000) (discussing how work
structure pressures employees to behave in certain ways to perform a work identity). But see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94

CALIF. L. REv. 1, 3 (2006) (noting significant obstacles exist in addressing structural
discrimination through current discrimination law).
351 Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying AntidiscriminationLaw Through Stereotype Theory, 20
LEwIs & CLARK L. REv. 919,925 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent recognition
of how stereotypes disadvantage transgender people and caregivers in the workplace should
be extended to other patterns of stereotyping in workplaces).
352 Carbado & Harris, supra note 315, at 2202 (discussing the inability of employment

discrimination doctrine to properly address discrimination of Black women given that Black
women's "experience[s] could not be marked along a single axis"); Kotkin, supra note 315,
at 1459 (describing a 2006 study of employment discrimination claims in federal district
courts that found defendants prevailed on summary judgment 73% of the time, and 93% of
the time in cases involving multiple claims). See generally Crenshaw, supra note 315

(describing contours of intersectional discrimination).
3 Lawrence, supra note 315, at 321 ("Acknowledging and understanding the malignancy
[of racism] are prerequisites to the discovery of an appropriate cure.").
114 See supra note 9.
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However, to date, there has not been a consistent effort by courts to rid
3 55
discrimination law of even the named doctrines.
A procedural path may be more palatable, easier to understand, and easier to
implement. The path forward I propose does not rely on any particular
theoretical framing but rather on common ideas that underlie many of the
theoretical critiques. Almost all of the critiques discussed throughout this Article
relate to a tendency to try to reduce discrimination claims to a narrow set of
circumstances and to fail to listen to plaintiffs, all while unduly favoring
" For example, there is a robust literature critiquing the McDonnell Douglas framework.
See, e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Proving Discriminationby the Text, 106 MINN. L. REv. 353,
404 (2021) (referencing courts' reluctance to abandon McDonnell Douglas and suggesting
path forward); Eyer, supra note 9, at 967 ("The lower courts' technical approach to the
McDonnell Douglas paradigm represents one of the most significant and pervasive obstacles
to contemporary anti-discrimination enforcement."); Goldberg, supra note 315, at 748
(criticizing McDonnell Douglas framework for providing no guidance as to how courts should
consider competing accounts of employer action); William R. Corbett, Babbling About
Employment DiscriminationLaw: Does the Master Builder Understandthe Blueprintfor the
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 683, 725 (2010) (referring to the McDonnell Douglas
framework as "hoary"); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discriminationby Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REv. 191, 197 (2009) (setting out to present a
simpler proof structure for disparate treatment cases); Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of
Second-OrderUniformity in DisparateTreatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's Longevity and
the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 512 (2008) (describing McDonnell Douglas's
continued prominence as unfortunate); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the

Desert Palace, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1564 (2005) (analyzing the "death" of McDonnell
Douglas in the wake of Desert Palace); Michael J. Zimmer, The New DiscriminationLaw:
Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1890 (2004)
(criticizing how McDonnell Douglas and its progeny complicated plaintiffs' ability to get to
trial); William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U.

PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 200 (2003) (referencing how many are "celebrating the death of
the McDonnell Douglas proof structure"); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le
Roi! ": An Essay on the QuietDemise ofMcDonnell Douglas and the TransformationofEvery
Title VII CaseAfter Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L.

REv. 71, 76 (2003) (referring to McDonnell Douglas-Burdineframework as a "bland diet");
William R. Corbett, OfBabies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out ProofStructures:It Is Not Time

to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 361, 364 (1998) (stating that
McDonnell Douglas has taken much criticism over the years by commentators); Stephen W.
Smith, Title VIi's NationalAnthem: Is There a PrimaFacie Casefor the PrimaFacieCase?,

12 LAB. LAw. 371, 372 (1997) (making the case that McDonnell Douglas "muddles the
decision-making process"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
CognitiveBias Approach to DiscriminationandEqual Employment Opportunity,47 STAN. L.

REv. 1161, 1218 (1995) (exploring several ways in which the McDonnellDouglasframework
proved "inadequate"); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After

Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2236 (1995) (arguing for the abandonment of McDonnell
Douglas); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell
Douglas Is Not Justifiedby Any Statutory ConstructionMethodology, 43 Hous. L. REv. 743,

745 (2006) (describing the widespread nature of criticism of the value of the McDonnell
Douglas framework). But see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE

L. REv. 109, 116 (2007) ("[Plaintiffs and commentators] should embrace McDonnell
Douglas as a true gift to antidiscrimination law.").
DAME
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employers. I argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 try to address similar concerns in litigation more broadly. 356
For the most impact, the Supreme Court could use its supervisory authority
over the federal courts to require lower courts to follow prescribed rules to
protect against evidentiary inequality. 357 However, even if the Supreme Court
does not create these rules, appellate courts or district courts can still use them
to reduce or eliminate this inequality.
Here are three procedural steps that courts can take to diminish evidentiary

inequality in discrimination cases.
Step One: Explicitly Recognize the Problem. The Supreme Court should

explicitly recognize evidentiary inequality and create boilerplate language that
courts can use to understand and guard against the problem.
For example, the Court could indicate that over time, the courts have
inappropriately narrowed discrimination law through a series of doctrines that
favor the employer and disfavor the employee. The Court could note that courts
have applied the doctrines inconsistently in ways that expand the employer's
evidence and restrict the plaintiff's evidence. The Court could note that
evidentiary inequality often contradicts both Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.358
At first blush this might seem unrealistic. However, the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions has repudiated overly narrow constructions of
discrimination law. 359 And while the Court has played some role in centering
intent and pretext in discrimination jurisprudence, 3 60 many of the problematic
issues discussed in this Article have been repudiated by the Supreme Court or
not been explicitly addressed by it. This language would be an explicit reminder
to judges that they collectively have not treated employers' evidence and
plaintiffs' evidence similarly and that they need to be aware of this problem. 361

356

While it is possible for the core principles of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to be used in ways that favor or disfavor particular parties, this
inequality is not inherently a part of either rule.

3" See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (describing Supreme Court's authority to prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure for federal district and appellate courts).
358 In some cases, evidentiary inequality might only violate one of these rules. For
example, if a judge admits a plaintiff's evidence as relevant but then inappropriately

diminishes the weight of the evidence, this would implicate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 but not Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
359 See generally Eyer, supra note 9 (discussing how Supreme Court has often warned
against making McDonnell Douglastoo narrow).
360 See Aziz Z. Huq, What Is DiscriminatoryIntent?, 103 CORNELL L. REv. 1211, 1222-

23 (2018) (analyzing the efficacy of the jurisprudence of discriminatory intent); Noah D. Zatz,
Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REv. 1357, 1360-61 (2017)
(discussing the Court's "cramped focus on discriminatory intent").
361 Kang et al., supra note 7, at 1172-73 (discussing ways to have decisionmakers
challenge their biases, including providing information to them about cognitive bias).
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Step Two: Require Judges to Explain All of the Plaintiffs Evidence. When

granting a summary judgment motion for the employer, judges should be
required to completely describe any evidence that might favor the plaintiff. The
only way that a court can determine if there is no genuine dispute of fact and
read all inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party is to fully
consider all of the evidence submitted by the nonmoving party.
As seen throughout this Article, courts often describe more of the defendants'
362
They often label the plaintiffs'
evidence than the plaintiffs' evidence.
without fully describing the
opinion
evidence as irrelevant or as merely an
poor performance
plaintiff's
a
of
evidence
evidence. Courts often describe
without describing the plaintiff's good performance. At a minimum, it seems

there should be an obligation to explain the plaintiff's good performance in the
same level of detail as the judge explains the plaintiff's misconduct or poor
performance.
It is impossible to determine whether a court considered evidence related to
summary judgment if the court does not describe it. If a judge believes that
summary judgment in the employer's favor is appropriate, the judge should be
required to completely describe all evidence that favors the plaintiff. This sounds
like it would already be a staple of summary judgment order writing, but it is
not.

After the judge completely describes the plaintiff's evidence, the judge can
then describe why summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate, given the full

evidentiary record that favors the plaintiff. This does not mean that a judge must
credit all of the plaintiff's evidence. For example, some of the plaintiff's
evidence may not meet the definition of relevance, might be hearsay, or might
be inadmissible for other reasons. A judge should first be required to describe
the evidence and then describe why the evidence is inadmissible or problematic.
Step Three: Require Judges to Explain Why They Include Evidence That

Favors the Defendant. Judges should be required to explain how they are
complying with procedural and evidentiary rules when they describe or rely on
a defendant's evidence.
Judges often begin their summary judgment orders by describing the facts of
the case. However, as discussed throughout the Article, this description often
omits facts that favor the plaintiff. At the same time, judges often describe facts
that favor the defendant, even when these facts are contested by the plaintiff, are
not relevant to the claim, or are vague or conclusory.

If a judge includes contested facts or irrelevant facts in the order that favors
the defendant, the judge should be required to explain why those facts are
363
included and in what way the facts are being used. If the court draws any
inferences in favor of the moving party, the court should be required to explain

362

See supra Section I.B.

plaintiff's counsel should also explicitly challenge the employer's use of contested,
irrelevant, or inadmissible evidence. Special thanks to Professor Minna Kotkin for this
suggestion.
363
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why it is allowed to draw those inferences. Courts should be required to
determine whether the evidence submitted by the employer is admissible
evidence.
This simple step would eliminate some evidentiary inequality. For example,

as described above, courts often recite any misconduct or poor performance a
plaintiff ever engaged in during their entire tenure with an employer. Much of
the time this evidence is not relevant because it does not relate in any way to the
plaintiff's claim of employment discrimination or retaliation. If courts are
required to describe why they are including this evidence in their summary
judgment order, this should encourage courts to be more careful about how they
are drawing inferences.
These procedural solutions are easy to understand and do not require judges
to wade through complicated employment discrimination doctrines.
Importantly, they rely on foundational procedural notions about the way courts
must treat evidence fairly to ensure the right to a jury trial, principles Congress

included in the federal discrimination statutes.
Even if the Supreme Court refuses to use its supervisory authority to create
specific rules to govern how federal courts should consider evidence, the Court
should at least reiterate that it rejects inappropriate limits on plaintiffs' evidence
in employment discrimination cases. 364
CONCLUSION

There is rampant evidentiary inequality in discrimination cases. Judges

routinely favor the defendant's evidence and disfavor the plaintiff's evidence.
They often prohibit plaintiffs from relying on evidence while permitting
defendants to rely on similar evidence. This Article brought together hundreds
of cases to fully describe the evidentiary inequality and identify its sources. It
argues that the best way to resolve the inequality is to critique the underlying
ideas and doctrines both substantively and procedurally. It also provides a
roadmap for resolving the inequality grounded in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence.

364

See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-58 (2006) (rejecting courts' failures

to view evidence in light most favorable to the plaintiff); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 140, 150-52 (2000) (rejecting lower court's refusal to fully credit
all of plaintiff's evidence related to age discrimination).
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